



2018 CORE CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT

IOWA HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT

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Table of Contents

Summary	4
Process	4
Evaluation and Revision	5
Reading the Document.....	5
Capability-Specific Information Key: Questions Asked.....	6
Core Capabilities:	10
PLANNING	10
PUBLIC INFORMATION AND WARNING.....	14
OPERATIONAL COORDINATION	18
INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING	22
INTERDICTION AND DISRUPTION.....	26
SCREENING, SEARCH AND DETECTION.....	28
FORENSICS AND ATTRIBUTION	30
ACCESS CONTROL AND IDENTITY VERIFICATION	32
CYBERSECURITY	36
PHYSICAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES.....	40
RISK MANAGEMENT FOR PROTECTION PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES	44
SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRITY AND SECURITY.....	48
COMMUNITY RESILIENCE	50
LONG-TERM VULNERABILITY REDUCTION	54
RISK AND DISASTER RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT.....	56
THREATS AND HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION.....	58
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS	62
CRITICAL TRANSPORTATION	66
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE AND HEALTH AND SAFETY	68
FATALITY MANAGEMENT SERVICES	72
FIRE MANAGEMENT AND SUPPRESSION.....	76
LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT.....	80

MASS CARE SERVICES..... 84
MASS SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS 88
ON-SCENE SECURITY, PROTECTION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 92
OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS 94
PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTHCARE AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES 98
SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT..... 100
ECONOMIC RECOVERY..... 104
HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES 106
HOUSING..... 110
NATURAL AND CULTURAL RESOURCES..... 112

Summary

In 2011, FEMA issued the National Preparedness Goal, which established guidance for building capability and capacity in homeland security and emergency management at the national level, specifically in the areas of mitigation, prevention, protection, response, and recovery. The Goal identified 32 core capabilities to serve as the baseline for national capacity building, and directed a myriad of national efforts based on the level of preparedness in specific core capabilities, including preparedness reporting. The message of the Goal was simple -- in order to build capability, stock must be taken in what is truly needed, and what currently exists.

Building off this message, the 2018 Core Capabilities Assessment provides a comprehensive, solutions-based evaluation of the 32 federally-identified core capabilities, but on an Iowa-specific basis. What level of each identified capability does Iowa currently have? How much capacity in each capability does Iowa need? What activities need to take place in order to bridge the gap between current capabilities and target capabilities for our state? The 2018 Core Capabilities Assessment answers these questions by examining each capability separately, and providing information based on the solution areas of planning, organization, equipment, training and exercise.

In the end, the 2018 Core Capabilities Assessment provides Iowa with a baseline understanding of its needs, its current capacities, and activities that need to be implemented in order to bridge those capability gaps. It is a keystone document and decision point for the implementation of capability solutions, and the allocation of resources designed to reach or sustain these capability targets. It will serve as a baseline assessment upon which progress toward building those capabilities can be tracked annually. In short, the Assessment will assist Iowa in building capabilities and capacities in a more efficient and effective manner.

Process

The 2018 statewide capabilities assessment was built off the framework of the 2012 through 2017 editions of the Stakeholder Preparedness Review, with an emphasis placed on incorporating more input, especially from local emergency management. All 32 core capabilities, as identified in the 2015 National Preparedness Goal, were assessed. The assessment followed the process laid out in Comprehensive Planning Guidance 201 (CPG 201).

Capabilities were grouped in tiers based on how they connected with each other. In 2018, Iowa utilized four tiers: emergency management, intelligence and law enforcement, critical infrastructure and key resources, and outliers. For the first three capability tiers,

committees were formed for assessment. The largest tier was emergency management; three meetings were held to assess these capabilities, based around a committee of core local emergency management coordinators, and incorporating capability subject matter experts where applicable. Specific capabilities were focused on during additional meetings. Capabilities related to critical infrastructure were assessed by a committee that included representation from the private sector, local and state emergency management and the State of Iowa Fusion Center. Capabilities related to intelligence and law enforcement were assessed by a committee that included representation from state and local law enforcement, the State of Iowa Fusion Center along with state and local emergency management.

Each capability was assessed in the same manner. First, federal capability outcomes were used as a base to define state-specific targets for each capability. Discussion then commenced on how the capability would be deployed across the State, and how the use of the specific capability might unfold. Finally, the group discussed specific capabilities and shortfalls in planning, organization, equipment, training and exercise.

Evaluation and Revision

The Core Capabilities Assessment will be reviewed and revised annually, concurrent with the submittal schedule of the Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR), and the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) processes.

Reading the Document

Pages 6-9 contain keys, showing specific questions asked during the assessment. Each capability was assessed through the prism of planning, organization, equipment, training and exercise (POETE), with specific questions and scoring mechanisms.

Capability Question Section Key -- Provides the questions that were the focus of conversations for each POETE element of the capability.

Capability Scoring Key -- Provides a key for what each score means in the POETE sections for each capability.

Capability-Specific Information Key: Questions Asked

CAPABILITY	
CAPABILITY DEFINITION	<i>What is the definition of the capability? Provided by the National Preparedness Goal.</i>
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<i>What are specific capability targets for Iowa for this capability?</i>
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<i>Which Emergency Support Functions are applicable to this capability?</i>
IMPACT	<i>What hazard will stretch this capability the most? Provides a “worst-case” target for the capability.</i>
SUMMARY	<i>What is the background on the capability currently in Iowa?</i>
PLANNING	Capability Score
	GAP DESCRIPTION
	<i>What specific advances in planning would allow your jurisdiction to attain a rating of (5) for this capability?</i>
	RECENT ADVANCES
	<i>Describe any recent improvements in planning for this capability.</i>
	NOTES
	<i>Notes on the capability.</i>
ORGANIZATION	Capability Score
	GAP DESCRIPTION
	<i>What specific organizational changes would allow your jurisdiction to attain a rating of (5) for this capability?</i>
	RECENT ADVANCES
	<i>Describe any recent improvements in organization for this capability.</i>
	NOTES
	<i>Notes on the capability.</i>
EQUIPMENT	Capability Score
	GAP DESCRIPTION
	<i>What specific equipment would allow your jurisdiction to attain a rating of (5) for this capability?</i>
	RECENT ADVANCES
	<i>Describe any recent improvements in equipment for this capability.</i>
	NOTES
	<i>Notes on the capability.</i>
TRAINING	Capability Score
	GAP DESCRIPTION
	<i>What specific training would allow your jurisdiction to attain a rating of (5) for this capability?</i>
	RECENT ADVANCES
	<i>Describe any recent improvements in training for this capability.</i>
	NOTES

		<i>Notes on the capability.</i>
EXERCISE	Capability Score	GAP DESCRIPTION
		<i>What specific exercise activity would allow your jurisdiction to attain a rating of (5) for this capability?</i>
		RECENT ADVANCES
		<i>Describe any recent improvements in exercise for this capability.</i>
		NOTES
		<i>Notes on the capability.</i>

CAPABILITY SCORING EXPLANATIONS

AREA	SCORE	EXPLANATION FOR SCORE
PLANNING	1	No plans/annexes exist
	2	Some plans/annexes exist and/or lack some annexes or other required elements
	3	Plans/annexes are complete, but require updating
	4	Plans/annexes are complete and up to date and have been updated within five years
	5	Plans/annexes are complete and up to date; validated by exercises or real-world operations within the last two years; plans include coordination with higher levels of government and resource needs for catastrophic incidents
	N/A	Planning is not required for this capability
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	1	No plans/annexes exist
	2	Plans/annexes exist, but lack some annexes or other required elements
	3	Plans/annexes are complete and up to date
	4	Plans/annexes are complete and up to date; validated by exercises or real-world operations within the last five years
	5	Plans/annexes are complete and up to date; validated by exercises or real-world operations within the last two years; plans include coordination with higher levels of government and resource needs for catastrophic incidents
ORGANIZATION	1	Very few personnel required for the organizational structure exists (0%-20%)
	2	Few personnel required for the organizational structure exists (21%-40%)
	3	Many personnel required for the organizational structure exists (41%-60%)
	4	Most personnel required for the organizational structure exists (61%-80%)
	5	All/nearly all personnel required for the organizational structure exists (81%-100%)
	N/A	Organization is not relevant for this capability
	N/A	Organization for this capability is provided entirely by other jurisdictions
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	1	Very few personnel required for the organizational structure exists (0%-20%)
	2	Few personnel required for the organizational structure exists (21%-40%)
	3	Many personnel required for the organizational structure exists (41%-60%)
	4	Most personnel required for the organizational structure exists (61%-80%)
	5	All/nearly all personnel required for the organizational structure exists (81%-100%)
EQUIPMENT	1	Very little of the required equipment is in place (0%-20%)
	2	Little of the required equipment is in place (21%-40%)
	3	Some of the required equipment is in place (41%-60%)
	4	Most of the required equipment is in place (61%-80%)
	5	All/nearly all of the required equipment is in place (81%-100%)
	N/A	Equipment is not required for this capability or this capability is provided entirely by other jurisdictions
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	1	Very little of the required equipment is in place (0%-20%)
	2	Little of the required equipment is in place (21%-40%)
	3	Some of the required equipment is in place (41%-60%)
	4	Most of the required equipment is in place (61%-80%)

	5	All/nearly all of the required equipment is in place (81%-100%)
TRAINING	1	Very few relevant persons (0% - 20%) have completed relevant courses
	2	Few relevant persons (21% - 40%) have completed relevant courses
	3	Many few relevant persons (41% - 60%) have completed relevant courses
	4	Most relevant persons (61% - 80%) have completed relevant courses
	5	All or nearly all relevant persons (81%-100%) have completed relevant courses
	N/A	Training is not relevant for this capability or is provided entirely by other jurisdictions
TRAINING MUTUAL AID	1	Very few relevant persons (0% - 20%) have completed relevant courses
	2	Few relevant persons (21% - 40%) have completed relevant courses
	3	Many few relevant persons (41% - 60%) have completed relevant courses
	4	Most relevant persons (61% - 80%) have completed relevant courses
	5	All or nearly all relevant persons (81%-100%) have completed relevant courses
EXERCISE	1	No exercises or real-world operations have been conducted within the last five years
	2	Limited exercises or real-world operations have been conducted within the last five years; little documentation exists
	3	Exercises or real-world operations have been conducted within the last five years; AAR/IP documented
	4	Exercises or real-world operations have been conducted within the last two years; AAR/IP documented; most corrective actions have been implemented
	5	Exercises or real-world operations have been conducted within the last two years, including coordination with higher levels of government; AAR/IP documented; all corrective actions have been implemented
	N/A	Exercises are not relevant for this capability or are provided entirely by other jurisdictions
EXERCISE MUTUAL AID	1	No exercises or real-world operations have been conducted within the last five years
	2	Limited exercises or real-world operations have been conducted within the last five years; little documentation exists
	3	Exercises or real-world operations have been conducted within the last five years; AAR/IP documented
	4	Exercises or real-world operations have been conducted within the last two years; AAR/IP documented; most corrective actions have been implemented
	5	Exercises or real-world operations have been conducted within the last two years, including coordination with higher levels of government; AAR/IP documented; all corrective actions have been implemented

Core Capabilities

 <h2 style="margin: 0;">PLANNING</h2>	
CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community as appropriate in the development of executable strategic, operational and/or community-based approaches to meet defined objectives.
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Within every 2 years, update all emergency operations plans that define the roles and responsibilities of 29 partner organizations involved in incident management across 947 jurisdictions affected, and the sequence and scope of tasks needed to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from events Upon the discovery of credible information about an imminent threat, perform all (100%) crisis action planning to prevent any imminent terrorist attacks or follow-on attacks (Prevention) Develop and implement 100% of the executable multi-disciplinary plans with the whole community to achieve defined protection objectives (Protection) Translate and integrate 100% of the risk assessment data and information available into prioritized goals and actions that reduce vulnerability of the whole community to identified threats and hazards (Mitigation) Develop operational plans for the State and its counties that adequately identify critical objectives, and are implementable within the time frame defined in the plan using available resources (Response) Unify and coordinate expertise and assistance across federal and state governments to aid and engage whole community recovery planning and implementation in accordance with locally established timelines (Recovery)
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-1</u> Transportation, <u>ESF-2</u> Communications, <u>ESF-3</u> Public Works & Engineering, <u>ESF-4</u> Firefighting, <u>ESF-5</u> Emergency Management, <u>ESF-6</u> Mass Care, <u>ESF-7</u> Logistics & Resource Management, <u>ESF-8</u> Public Health & Medical, <u>ESF-9</u> Search and Rescue, <u>ESF-10</u> Hazmat, <u>ESF-11</u> Agriculture & Natural Resources, <u>ESF-12</u> Energy, <u>ESF-13</u> Public Safety & Security, <u>ESF-14</u> Recovery, <u>ESF-15</u> External Affairs
IMPACT	Mitigation, Response, Recovery plans; incident-specific plans as appropriate; 99 counties; 16 sectors (Cyber Attack THIRA Scenario)
SUMMARY	<p>The Planning capability takes place throughout the entire emergency management cycle, with distinct plans focused on different phases. Different aspects of planning in Iowa are guided by Iowa Code, federal requirements, and/or executive orders. Planning forms the basis of all emergency management activities.</p> <p>Each local emergency management commission in Iowa is required by Iowa Code to develop a hazard mitigation plan, an emergency operations plan, and a recovery plan that meets pre-determined criteria, and must be updated within five years of adoption. Different jurisdictions may have supplemented these plans with other plans related to homeland security and emergency management; this varies by jurisdiction.</p>

	<p>The State of Iowa is required by Iowa Code to complete the State of Iowa Hazard Mitigation Plan, the State of Iowa Emergency Operations Plan, the State of Iowa Recovery Plan, and the State of Iowa Critical Asset Protection Plan. Different elements within the State also develop plans related to emergency management and homeland security, including continuity of operations plans, continuity of government plans, and homeland security and emergency management strategic plans.</p>
<p>PLANNING</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">GAP DESCRIPTION</p>
	<p>All plans required by grant guidance, federal requirements, Iowa Code or Executive Order at all levels of government are completed and compliant. Plans need to be updated based on review schedules and exercise/operations experiences in order to achieve and maintain a (5) rating. Local-level involvement during the plan review process can be difficult to secure. The development of event-specific plans can vary widely depending on the jurisdiction drafting the plan. The establishment of basic plan perimeters based on event type need to be established. Strategic planning efforts at the local level could be more prevent as well as the integration of existing strategic plan goals into the state’s strategic plan.</p>
	<p style="text-align: center;">RECENT ADVANCES</p>
	<p>2 The State Recovery Plan has been re-written to the Recovery Support Function (RSF) format, and was formally approved and adopted in spring of 2016. Planned development of an update to the Foreign Animal Disease Plan to include the most current data possible (HSGP 2016 & 2017). The update will be developed by the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship (IDALS). Continue to support planning efforts statewide and ensuring that all plans are updated in accordance with pre-determined update schedules.</p>
	<p style="text-align: center;">NOTES</p>
<p>Plans are required by Iowa Code 29C, federal guidance and grant requirements. These plans include mitigation, response and recovery, and are required at both the state and local level. County Emergency Management Commissions are responsible for meeting planning requirements in the state code.</p>	
<p>PLANNING MUTUAL AID</p>	<p>N/A</p>
<p>ORGANIZATION</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION</p>
	<p>N/A</p>
	<p style="text-align: center;">GAP DESCRIPTION</p>
<p>4 Between the planners at HSEMD, the regional/district structure and the county emergency management coordinators, the infrastructure to complete plans required by the Iowa Code is in place at a basic level. The part-time nature of some local emergency management coordinators can inhibit plan development.</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;">RECENT ADVANCES</p>	
<p>Analyze current staffing levels at the State and review the existing shortfalls associated with each section of the Iowa Comprehensive Emergency Plan. Develop a staffing plan that would effectively address the identified shortfalls for plan development, updating and reviews.</p>	

		NOTES
		<p>At the local level, the organization is in place to perform planning. Continual attention must be made to ensure all potential responders to a local emergency operations center are educated on roles and responsibilities.</p> <p>At the state level, the State Emergency Operations Center has the capability to establish a planning cell during a disaster response. The purpose of this planning cell is large-scope incident action planning. Short term disaster planning is done in operations.</p>
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Incidental equipment needed throughout the planning phase: whether it's for plan development or updating, some form of equipment is needed in order to complete the identified task.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
	N/A	
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		<p>The major gap in training is ensuring people who will be required to plan are trained and proficient in plan development and planning processes, beyond the minimum ability level to simply fill out a template. Additionally, training needs to be available to those who are identified as an assisting agency or partner.</p>
		RECENT ADVANCES
		<p>In 2017, the Planning, Training, Exercise Strategy was developed and rolled out statewide. This document focuses and unifies planning, training and exercise efforts and strategically identifies Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and core capabilities to focus on for a three year span. The cycle starts over at the end with new ESFs and core capabilities identified. Continue to support training at the state and local level that sustains this capability of general planning. Ensure that ample opportunities exist statewide for those interested in receiving training.</p>
		NOTES
		<p>Collaboration between Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the Iowa Emergency Management Association is needed to review training requirements for planning at the local and state levels. Collaboration should focus specifically on planning requirements, how to run a planning process and how to write a plan.</p>

EXERCISE	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The major gap is in emphasizing planning processes during a disaster exercise. The unification efforts for planning, training and exercise also need to be strengthened.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Continue to learn from best practices and lessons learned from real world event's AARs. Work towards incorporating both into exercise efforts at the state and local level.
		NOTES
		Plans form the basis for any exercise program. Disaster-driven incident-specific planning can be exercised, including planning for complex, multi-operational periods. This particular element can be difficult to execute, given staffing and budget constraints.



PUBLIC INFORMATION AND WARNING

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken and the assistance being made available, as appropriate.
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within 12 hours' notice of an incident, deliver reliable and actionable information to 3,046,355 people affected, including 261,987 people with access and functional needs (affected) and 182,781 people with limited English proficiency affected • Ensure that the public receives advance notice as appropriate for all (100%) imminent terrorist attacks in a timely and well-coordinated manner (Prevention) • Communicate actionable information on significant threats and hazards to all (100%) involved operators, security officials, and the public on a need to know basis using effective and accessible indication and warning systems (Protection) • Provide 100% of timely and accurate information needed to provide risk-based decisions targeted to create resilient communities at all levels (Mitigation) • Within 2 hours, deliver, by all means necessary, critical lifesaving and sustaining information to all facets of society across the spectrum of impacted areas to expedite the delivery of emergency services and to inform the public of appropriate actions (Response) • Within 12 hours, deliver credible messages to inform ongoing emergency services and the public about protective measures and other life-sustaining actions and facilitate the transition to short-term recovery (Response) • Provide prompt, reliable, and relevant information and guidance in support of impacted communities throughout the recovery process (Recovery)
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-2</u> Communications, <u>ESF-5</u> Emergency Management, <u>ESF-13</u> Public Safety & Security, <u>ESF-15</u> External Affairs
IMPACT	Public Information to entire state, population >3,000,000; warnings to all 16 critical infrastructure sectors (Human Disease THIRA scenario)
SUMMARY	The Public Information and Warning capability is implemented throughout the entire emergency management cycle. Planning for the public information component of an emergency response is found in ESF 15(External Affairs) in both the State Emergency Response Plan and all county emergency response plans. Communications, including warning, is included under ESF 2. Across Iowa, jurisdictions utilize the internet, traditional media, electronic mail, social media, the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), the Alert Iowa warning system, the Emergency Alert System (EAS), HAM radio, the disaster information hotline, and other avenues to various degrees to provide information to stakeholders during all phases of a disaster.
PLANNING	3 GAP DESCRIPTION

		<p>There is still a gap in interacting with special populations at both the state and local levels. Planning is needed to identify special needs populations while respecting privacy laws and considerations, and developing ways to communicate directly with them.</p> <p>Plans are in place to activate State agency public information officers to assist state and local partners with public information needs.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">RECENT ADVANCES</p> <p>Continue to identify ways to incorporate the AFN population into existing planning efforts.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">NOTES</p> <p>Planning for the public information component of an emergency response is found in ESF 15 (External Affairs) in both the State Emergency Response Plan and all county emergency response plans. Communications, including warning, is included under ESF 2. Plans are updated every five years; the transition to ESFs was completed statewide in summer 2014.</p>
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	<p style="text-align: center;">MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION</p> <p>N/A</p>
ORGANIZATION	4	<p style="text-align: center;">GAP DESCRIPTION</p> <p>While the organizational framework exists to provide information and warnings, continuous outreach is necessary to connect information and warnings with new public and private sector partners.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">RECENT ADVANCES</p> <p>Continue to develop new outreach methods and sustain staffing necessary at the local and state level to support the execution of this capability.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">NOTES</p> <p>Between the SEOC, HSEMD, and its state and local partners, the organization exists to adequately implement this capability. Iowa utilizes internet, traditional media, electronic mail, social media, HSIN, the Alert Iowa System, EAS, HAM radio, the disaster information hotline, and other avenues to provide information to stakeholders during all phases of a disaster. These need to be expanded further, with more contacts added. Public information capabilities are included on the State's Incident Management Team (IMT). Public information is accomplished under the Joint Information Center (JIC) framework across the State. Counties have been extremely receptive in adopting the Alert Iowa System, which is provided to them free of charge. Currently, 84 counties are utilizing the system. Also, a majority of the State does have the traditional warning systems (e.g. sirens) in place.</p> <p>Better integration and delegation of responsibilities is required In regards to interface between law enforcement and local first responders. Key focus areas for integration improvement include who shares what messages, and how information is disseminated. Sharing more information provides a better basis for more complete management on potential consequences of an attack or incident. Work needs to be done to identify how the most information can be shared to those who need it, without compromising confidentiality and sensitivity requirements on intelligence (related to the Intelligence and Information Sharing capability).</p>
ORGANIZATION		<p style="text-align: center;">MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION</p>

MUTUAL AID	N/A	N/A
EQUIPMENT	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Necessary equipment for the IMTs has been purchased, but does require sustainment through maintenance and/or replacement. Local EOCs and officials may require specific incident management equipment.
		Participation of all counties in the Alert Iowa System is currently at 88% (87 out of 99 counties are participating as of fall 2017).
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Implementation of the Alert Iowa System in 2015, a free statewide warning system available for emergency officials to share information to residents in counties that use it. Evaluate existing equipment that supports this capability. Identify shortfalls at the state and local levels.
		NOTES
N/A		
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		While required personnel have completed relevant courses, Iowa needs to look at developing state-specific JIC training and offer these courses to potential public information personnel. Iowa also needs to provide training on handling caveats for sensitive information.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Analyze current JIC protocols and look at developing position specific training opportunities for new and existing partners. Look at providing sensitive information handling training throughout the state.
		NOTES
Main PIO personnel have completed required training courses. A core cadre of public information officers beyond HSEMD are available to backfill based on need; this group has received on-the-job training due to the frequency of disasters over the last few years.		
EXERCISE	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Need to develop more opportunities to test ability to share information and warning with a variety of stakeholders and identify areas for improvement. Exercises/opportunities for evaluation need to be developed not only for traditional information sharing methods, but also for new media and new partners/audiences.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Evaluate ways to integrate this capability into upcoming exercises. Specifically look at adding social media and outreach to new audiences as part of the exercise.
		NOTES
Public information and warning functions are annually exercised via the nuclear power plant exercises.		

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OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within 3 days of a potential or actual incident, establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process across 323 jurisdictions affected and with 29 partner organizations involved in incident management. Maintain for 2 weeks • Establish all (100%) appropriate courses of action and provide oversight for complex operations associated with preventing an imminent or follow-on terrorist attack (Prevention) • Ensure all (100%) investigative and intelligence activities are coordinated to provide actionable intelligence for cohesive command and control of operations associated to prevent imminent or follow-on terrorist attack (Prevention) • Establish and maintain 100% of the operational structures that support networking, planning, and coordination between all protection partners (Protection) • Incorporate mitigation efforts that connect mitigation planning to community development decision-making processes (Mitigation) • Within 12 hours, implement activation plans at all levels of government and society, to ensure the mobilization of all critical resources, and establish command, control, and coordination structures within the affected community and other coordinating bodies in surrounding communities and across the State to respond to emergencies in an efficient and cost-effective manner (Response) • Within 3 days, enhance and maintain NIMS compliant command, control and coordination structures to meet basic human needs, stabilize the incident and transition to short-term recovery (Recovery) • Establish and maintain unified and integrated coordinating structures with critical stakeholders to support state, tribal, and local recovery decision-making processes, goals and objectives, and timelines
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-1</u> Transportation, <u>ESF-2</u> Communications, <u>ESF-3</u> Public Works & Engineering, <u>ESF-4</u> Firefighting, <u>ESF-5</u> Emergency Management, <u>ESF-6</u> Mass Care, <u>ESF-7</u> Logistics & Resource Management, <u>ESF-8</u> Public Health & Medical, <u>ESF-9</u> Search and Rescue, <u>ESF-10</u> Hazmat, <u>ESF-11</u> Agriculture & Natural Resources, <u>ESF-12</u> Energy, <u>ESF-13</u> Public Safety & Security, <u>ESF-14</u> Recovery, <u>ESF-15</u> External Affairs
IMPACT	56,000 square miles; State EOC; state agency EOCs; county EOCs; multiple operating centers (Human Disease THIRA scenario)
SUMMARY	The Operational Coordination capability takes place from the notification of an imminent threat or disaster, through to incident closure. The basis for this capability is the National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS lays out a basic command and organization structure, built off the concept of the Incident Command System (ICS). NIMS has been adopted locally, at the state level, and

		<p>nationally. NIMS offers scalable response assets, based on specific incident parameters.</p> <p>At the local level, county emergency response coordinators and emergency officials are required to be trained in NIMS at position-specific levels. Incident Management Teams (IMTs) are a statewide resource that provide incident planning and management support to those local jurisdictions in incidents up to and including Type-III (multiple jurisdictions/multiple days).</p>
PLANNING	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		No specific planning advances are needed, but not all plans have been exercised to validate them. Plans are currently being updated based on previous operations. County emergency management agencies have released a standard for Emergency Operations Centers in Iowa.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Continue to build on the findings from previously completed exercises. Apply them to existing plans during the update cycle.
		NOTES
		<p>Iowa maintains a Type-III Incident Management Team (IMT) that is available for deployment statewide; the IMT can support local incident command during an incident. The IMT is available to provide operational coordination and support to local jurisdictions. The IMT does not take over command and management of an incident.</p> <p>The State asks multiple stakeholders to certify through NIMS training at different position-specific levels; this is validated through the NIMSCAST tool. Incident management is directed through ESF 5 (Emergency Management) in both the State and local emergency operations plans.</p>
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		County emergency response coordinators and emergency officials are required to be trained in NIMS at position-specific levels. The IMTs provide incident planning and management support to those local jurisdictions in incidents up to and including Type-III (multiple jurisdictions/multiple days). The ability to sustain specialized personnel beyond the first 24-48 hours of a response needs to be studied at the local and state levels, including identifying what specialized skills are needed, and who has those skills within those jurisdictions (ex: financial officers). Stakeholder participation at some local level EOCs can be difficult.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Identify ways to bolster staffing for long duration events, up to and including Type III.
		NOTES
		N/A
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	4	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		When necessary, Iowa can request federal IMTs, and IMTs from other states for incident support.
EQUIPMENT	3	GAP DESCRIPTION

		Necessary equipment for the IMTs has been purchased, but that equipment may require maintenance or replacement. Local EOCs and officials may require specific incident management equipment.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Continue to evaluate equipment needs of the IMT and state/local EOCs.
		NOTES
		N/A
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Position specific training is needed for IMT members. NIMS/ICS courses need to be conducted across the state due to staff changes at all levels of government. A condensed version of EOC operations is needed (1 day versus 5 days), which would allow more volunteers and individuals with full-time jobs the possibility to attend.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Continue to evaluate the training needs of the IMT along with any active participant in the local and state EOCs.
		NOTES
	N/A	
EXERCISE	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Because the operations tempo in the state from actual events has been high, time is needed to update plans and revalidate them through actual events or exercises. Specific exercises testing connectivity between local EOCs, and connectivity to the State EOC are needed.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Through the re-accreditation process for the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP), a majority of HSEMD's operational plans were reviewed and updated. However, more work does need to be done in the validation side of things, through exercises and real world events.
		NOTES
	Incident command is constantly being tested across the State in some form in every exercise and disaster response.	

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INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

<p>CAPABILITY DEFINITION</p>	<p>Provide timely, accurate, and actionable information resulting from the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available information concerning threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation, or use of WMDs; or any other matter bearing on U.S. national or homeland security by Federal, state, local, and other stakeholders. Information sharing is the ability to exchange intelligence, information, data, or knowledge among Federal, state, local, or private sector entities, as appropriate.</p>
<p>CAPABILITY TARGETS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure federal, state, local and private sector partners possess or have access to a mechanism to submit terrorism-related information and/or suspicious activity reports to law enforcement • Share relevant, timely and actionable information and analysis with federal, state, local, and private sector partners, and develop and disseminate appropriate classified/unclassified products. • Anticipate and identify emerging and/or imminent threats through the intelligence cycle.
<p>IDENTIFIED ESF(S)</p>	<p><u>ESF-2</u> Communications, <u>ESF-5</u> Emergency Management <u>ESF-13</u> Public Safety & Security, <u>ESF-15</u> External Affairs</p>
<p>IMPACT</p>	<p>99 counties; 16 sectors (Terrorism- Cyber THIRA scenario)</p>
<p>SUMMARY</p>	<p>The Intelligence and Information capability is considered to take place consistently. Iowa has a statewide intelligence system in place that offers the ability to receive information from all levels and partners, analyze that information and “fuse” it with other intelligence, and then provide that information to the end user to assist in active cases. Intelligence and Information Sharing is governed by Iowa Code, Chapter 692, and Federal Regulation 28 CFR. These regulations specify and limit the types of information that can be shared, who that information can be shared with, and the circumstances under which it can be shared. When someone is under an immediate threat, that person can be contacted directly.</p> <p>At the local level, law enforcement revolves around local police departments, and county sheriff offices. Intelligence from active local cases is routinely collected and analyzed at the local level. Local law enforcement, whether acting on a credible threat, or identifying relevant case information, can share this information with public and private sector partners in their jurisdictions on a need to know basis. This process is based on existing relationships, rather than any formal procedural requirement. The system is also in place for local law enforcement to forward and receive intelligence information to and from the Department of Public Safety for further analysis.</p> <p>At the state level, Iowa operates the State of Iowa Fusion Center (IFC). All-crimes intelligence is received from the public, the private sector, local law enforcement and federal law enforcement, analyzed at the IFC, and then pertinent information is shared to those who need it. Partners from federal law</p>

		enforcement agencies are imbedded in the IFC as well, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A); these imbeds facilitate information sharing between state and federal authorities.
PLANNING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The creation of a suspicious activity reporting system is needed. Guidance also needs to be developed for both the public and private sectors on what constitutes “suspicious” activity and what the reporting mechanisms should be.
		The development of an information sharing plan needs to be created, focusing on ways to disseminate information from the state level (fusion center) down to the county and local levels (local police departments). This information would feed into the development of the TIIPP/Fusion Center strategic plan and would also contain information on how the TIIPP and Fusion Center will be fully integrated. Additional guidelines need to be established on what types of reports and products will be distributed to which parties.
		Implementation of the Homeland Security Information Network – Iowa (HSIN-IA) portal with our public and private sector partners is ongoing, subject to system limitations. Integration between the Fusion Center and the State Emergency Operations Center needs to continue.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		To support this initiative DPS and HSEMD developed an MOA that allows integration of HSEMD staff into the Fusion Center to support coordination and outreach to public and private sector partners on information sharing, asset protection and infrastructure protection. Integration of the TIIPP into the larger Fusion Center process is progressing. The “See Something, Say Something” (S4) campaign was rolled out in 2013. The Suspicious Activity Reporting System (SARS) has also been rolled out. 2016 HSGP- forecasting the hosting of a LEIN school to train LEIN officers (approximately 40) whom reside throughout the State.
		NOTES
		N/A
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The structure is in place for information sharing in Iowa. Future investment will need to be made in sustainment of positions statewide in order for that structure to continue to function. Work needs to be done to ensure that everyone knows how to plug in to the system, especially in rural areas of the state. Work also needs to be done to be more inclusive of the private sector, including what to share and how to share it appropriately. Gaps include ensuring that Iowa’s information systems include a wide distribution of users, and that the correct recipients are able to receive

		information. Continue to build the fusion system as a “network of networks.”
		With the closing of the regional fusion offices, some of the local focus on intelligence and information sharing is being turned into a secondary responsibility, after basic law enforcement operations.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		Between the Fusion Center, its analysts, the TIIPP, sector points of contact, the Law Enforcement Intelligence Network (LEIN) regions, the structure is in place to successfully share information. However, work still needs to be done to make sure the pieces work together. Contacts for information sharing from the public and private sectors still need to be added.
		The Iowa Fusion Center has the ability and capacity to sanitize intelligence for local and state agencies to provide information at an unclassified level to parties that need it.
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		No equipment is necessary at this time.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		The Suspicious Activity Reporting System (SARS) needs to be fleshed out further before equipment question can be answered in full. The potential exists for software and equipment upgrades to be required during integration of the TIIPP and SARS into the Fusion Center.
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Identify necessary personnel at the local, county and state levels that need training in information sharing and analysis, and provide this training to them. Continual training in intelligence-led policing and the importance of critical infrastructure is needed for front-line law enforcement. Intelligence-led policing is a standard for academies related to the Iowa Department of Public Safety, but this emphasis needs to be expanded to other law enforcement academies in the state.
		Training needs to be developed for volunteers, part-time staff and outside assisting agencies on safeguarding sensitive information.

		<p>More work and focus needs to be placed on educating private sector partners, and the public at large, about the definition of “suspicious.” What types of things should be reported and where are they reported to? How is this balanced without tipping off what the triggers for “suspicious” are?</p> <p>The TIIPP Report needs to be reviewed, with exploration into whether it can be used as a training tool in addition to a mechanism for sharing information.</p>
	RECENT ADVANCES	
	Fusion Center analysts are fully trained.	
	NOTES	
	Once the programs become more concrete, new training may need to be developed on information sharing and other areas. Once the See Something, Say Something campaign is rolled out, many people will need to be trained, especially at the local level. Local partners will also need to be trained on the SARS initiative.	
EXERCISE	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Need to do exercises that test information flow, systems, validating of processes, and development of work products needed. These areas can easily be incorporated into existing exercises to some degree and should be considered moving forward.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Most of the exercise work that has gone into the score of “3” is from real-world events.
		NOTES
		N/A



INTERDICTION AND DISRUPTION

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Delay, divert, intercept, halt, apprehend, or secure threats and/or hazards.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Locate 100% of all suspected weapon(s), threat actor(s), and/or materials to include urgent activities required for an imminent threat • Delay, divert, halt, apprehend, or secure all (100%) imminent threats 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-13</u> Public Safety & Security	
IMPACT	Multiple attack avenues (Terrorism THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	<p>The Interdiction and Disruption capability takes place once a credible threat has been established. Depending on the incident type and situation needs, different mechanisms are in place for interdiction and disruption.</p> <p>At the local level, interdiction and disruption is implemented by law enforcement, along with other local first responders. Depending on the nature of the hazard or threat, these responders can be supplemented by a number of mutual aid and state resources, including other local law enforcement, state law enforcement, special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, the Iowa Veterinary Rapid Response Team (IVRRT), the 71st Civil Support Team (CST), and the WMD Hazardous Materials teams. Federal resources can also be called in to assist when appropriate, and many times will already be involved in the investigation.</p>	
PLANNING	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Plans for the existing capabilities are in place. Plans and SOPs for specific teams are reviewed and updated on an annual basis. The Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) Protocol needs to be updated to ensure continued accuracy of the information contained within it. Review and update local operational plans to reflect interaction with all deployable statewide special teams.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		The CBRNE Protocol is currently being updated (2017)
		NOTES
		This capability begins and ends with local resources. The WMD Hazmat teams, the state bomb teams, state SWAT teams, the IVRRT, the 71 st CST and the Iowa Department of Transportation - Motor Vehicle Enforcement all play a role in the success of this capability as a supplement to local resources. Teams are in place, but smaller communities may not be equipped to interact with them during an incident. NIMS governs how the different capabilities interact.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Continue to recruit technicians for special teams. Continue to educate responders, emergency managers and elected leaders on deployable statewide special teams and their capabilities.

		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		NIMS governs how the different capabilities interact.
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		All teams have the required equipment, but that equipment requires upkeep and replacement periodically. Each statewide deployable team has its own base set of equipment in order to be able to function, and these teams need to be assessed annually to ensure they are meeting standards. As technology changes and new equipment is developed, equipment needs may change. Sustainment is an ongoing effort to maintain the current level of capability.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Underway with 2016 HSGP funding: Purchase response equipment and distribute equally among the eight (8) Statewide Task Force Bomb Squads: Eight (8) Nexray FPX Nano Tactical X-ray Scanners. Purchase 60 LION Chemical Protective Suits to be distributed among all five State SWAT teams.
		NOTES
Specifically, the biological agent field detection equipment does not have a standard. If a standard is identified and Iowa doesn't meet it, or if additional equipment is developed, teams may need to purchase this equipment as well.		
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Jurisdictions need to be trained in how to incorporate special teams and other resources into a response.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
All training for this capability is up to date. Continued NIMS training is appropriate.		
EXERCISE	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
N/A		



SCREENING, SEARCH AND DETECTION

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Identify, discover, or locate threats and/or hazards through active and passive surveillance and search procedures. This may include the use of systematic examinations and assessments, sensor technologies, or physical investigation and intelligence.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Screen 100% of targeted cargo, conveyances, mail, baggage and people to detect weapons of mass destruction, and to identify traditional and emerging threats and hazards of concern 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-9</u> Search and Rescue, <u>ESF-10</u> Hazmat, <u>ESF-13</u> Public Safety & Security	
IMPACT	Multiple attack avenues (Terrorism THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	The Screening, Search and Detection capability is implemented throughout the emergency management cycle.	
PLANNING	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Plans and procedures may need to be updated periodically to maintain this (5) rating. A protocol needs to be developed for screening, search and detection at large scale or significant events.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		CDC maintains the Biowatch program as a bio-surveillance system in multiple large cities in Iowa that scan the air for biological agents. The program is sponsored by the CDC, and managed in partnership between DPH, DNR and the University of Iowa. CBRNE detection systems provided by the teams and Motor Vehicle Enforcement are mobile and can be deployed across the State.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		Iowa has a laboratory system to identify materials, and a field capability for some samples. Iowa has the Biowatch system for bio-surveillance in cities across Iowa. Specialty teams and Motor Vehicle Enforcement have the capability to detect CBRNE materials. The teams have the necessary trained health care, emergency medical, veterinary and environmental lab professionals. Special teams are in place to respond to CBRNE events.
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	5	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		EMAC/IMAC
EQUIPMENT	5	GAP DESCRIPTION

		The necessary equipment is in place to detect CBRNE materials. Equipment may require maintenance or replacement as necessary in the future.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		N/A
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	5	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		EMAC/IMAC
TRAINING	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		None currently identified.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		Training is up to date.
EXERCISE	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		This capability needs to be exercised at the local level.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Iowa's specialty teams have done three exercises that included screening, search and detection for CBRNE materials. These exercises included the WMD HazMat team, DOT Motor Vehicle Enforcement, WMD SWAT, WMD EOD, the IMT, local fire, the 71 st CST, Postal Inspection, two hospitals and law enforcement. These exercises were held in Iowa City, Waterloo and Mason City.
		NOTES
		N/A



FORENSICS AND ATTRIBUTION

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Conduct forensics analysis and attribute terrorist acts (including the means and methods of terrorism) to their source, to include forensic analysis as well as attribution for an attack and for the preparation for an attack in an effort to prevent initial or follow-on acts and/or swiftly develop counter-options.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collect and examine all (100%) evidence associated with an act of terrorism or an imminent terrorist attack • Identify all (100%) of the terrorist actors, co-conspirators, and their sponsors by fusing all science-based forensic results and all-source intelligence information and products 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-10</u> Hazmat, <u>ESF-13</u> Public Safety & Security	
IMPACT	99 counties; 16 sectors (Terrorism- Cyber THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	<p>The Forensics and Attribution capability takes place immediately after a crime has been committed.</p> <p>Forensics and attribution begins at the local law enforcement level. Local law enforcement can call for support from state crime scene investigation resources when needed. In any case of suspected terrorism, federal authorities will play a major role in crime scene investigation. Local, state and federal authorities have clear procedures in place for joint investigations; these are usually accomplished through a task force approach.</p>	
PLANNING	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		<p>A single, consistent evidence management system needs to be implemented statewide to ensure that evidence is handled, catalogued and stored properly. Currently, evidence rooms vary across the state.</p> <p>Additional effort is needed to analyze potential ways to collect and utilize digital media, network exploitation and cyber technical analysis prevention efforts. These methods should be incorporated into existing planning efforts.</p>
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		Procedures are in place for crime scene investigation at local and state levels. Due to the diverse nature of different crime scenes, the procedures contain mostly general information.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		The Iowa Department of Public Safety has seven crime scene teams. Each team contains two people, and the shifts rotate on an “on call” basis.

ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	5	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		Mutual aid is available for law enforcement investigations, including arson investigations.
EQUIPMENT	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Once a statewide evidence management system has been identified and adopted, equipment may be necessary to meet standards.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		The Department of Public Safety keeps a “wish list” of equipment, but has what it needs to conduct forensics and attribution.
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		Basic training for law enforcement includes a basic evidence preservation and collection component. More training on evidence preservation needs to be reviewed and possibly provided for other first responders that may respond to a scene. Crime scene investigators attend Beginning Crime Scene School. Crime scene training is held monthly by the Iowa Department of Public Safety, which provides training on different specific areas of crime scene investigation.
EXERCISE	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		Local departments implement this capability at all crime scenes, but do not exercise this capability for terrorism-related incidents that they do not routinely encounter. The DPS teams are deployed between 35 and 50 times per year. An informal after action process is done after each of these deployments. Because of the volume of deployments, the teams do not have a set exercise program.



ACCESS CONTROL AND IDENTITY VERIFICATION

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Apply a broad range of physical, technological, and cyber measures to control admittance to critical locations and systems, limiting access to authorized individuals to carry out legitimate activities.				
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure 100% identity verification of individuals to authorize, grant or deny access to specific physical locations and systems, in order to protect critical facilities and assets Ensure 100% identity verification of individuals to authorize, grant or deny access to specific cyber locations and systems in order to protect critical facilities and assets 				
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-13</u> Public Safety & Security				
IMPACT	16 sectors; multiple assets (River Flooding THIRA scenario)				
SUMMARY	<p>The Access Control and Identity Verification capability is considered to occur continuously. Iowa maintains a list of assets that meet set criteria to be considered “critical.” This list is reviewed and refined on a regular basis for accuracy, based on changing factors of threat, vulnerability or consequence. This capability is predicated on understanding of critical assets and systems.</p> <p>Both the public and private sectors have assets or nodes that are considered critical. For the most part, the assets themselves have been responsible for providing access control and identity verification when applicable. The State of Iowa has done some work with state assets for target hardening.</p> <p>Another phase of this capability is in access control and identity verification in response to an emergency incident, where additional security may be required for a temporary period of time based on specific factors or changes in threat, vulnerability or consequence. If this occurs, public sector plans are in place to provide some level of access control and identity verification for critical sites; this may also be provided by the assets themselves.</p>				
PLANNING	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr style="background-color: #f4a460;"> <th style="width: 10%;"></th> <th style="text-align: center;">GAP DESCRIPTION</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; vertical-align: top;">2</td> <td> <p>Certain assets have sufficient access control and identity verification parameters, whether public or private. More work needs to be done to identify key resources and key nodes within critical systems on a sector by sector basis; once a comprehensive study has been completed, resources can be allocated for this capability based on the results. More work is needed to review and update the access control and identity verification protocols that are currently in use. Additional clarification is needed in plans and procedures to differentiate cyber and physical access.</p> <p>As the use of unmanned aerial platforms by public and private entities become more prevalent, the need to restrict air space during an event or after an incident should be reviewed and possibly incorporated into the existing access control and identity verification protocols.</p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		GAP DESCRIPTION	2	<p>Certain assets have sufficient access control and identity verification parameters, whether public or private. More work needs to be done to identify key resources and key nodes within critical systems on a sector by sector basis; once a comprehensive study has been completed, resources can be allocated for this capability based on the results. More work is needed to review and update the access control and identity verification protocols that are currently in use. Additional clarification is needed in plans and procedures to differentiate cyber and physical access.</p> <p>As the use of unmanned aerial platforms by public and private entities become more prevalent, the need to restrict air space during an event or after an incident should be reviewed and possibly incorporated into the existing access control and identity verification protocols.</p>
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		The incorporation of a credential management system into existing plans and protocols in order to accurately vet anyone allowed into a secured scene or event. Further analysis of Emergency Services Sector Coordinating Council's (ESSCC) Crisis Event Response, Recovery and Access Standard (CERRA) needs to be conducted to see if it could be used as the basis for Iowa's credential validation platform.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		The public sector has done a large amount of recent work in access control for public cyber networks.
		NOTES
		Private industry may have business-related reasons to implement this capability on critical sites and processes within their own business networks, whether physical or cyber. At a government level, this capability would be governed by local and State Emergency Operations Plans, especially ESF 5 (Emergency Management), ESF 13 (Public Safety and Security), and in the case of the worst case scenario presented above, ESF 11 (Agriculture and Food Security). If resources are necessary to implement this capability, resource management is governed under ESF 7 (Logistics Management and Resource Support). These plans are updated every five years.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		A vast majority of critical sites and system operators are responsible for access control and identity verification within their own systems. More work needs to be done to understand sectors and critical assets, and to ensure that assets that are critical are protected.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
	Between the State Patrol, state peace officers, county police and local law enforcement, the organization is in place to provide security, access control and identity verification for physical buildings. Other responders can be used to provide access control and identity verification for physical buildings as well.	
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		More work needs to be done to understand sectors and critical assets, and to ensure that critical assets are protected. Once that assessment is completed, additional equipment needs may be identified.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES

		The Iowa Department of Transportation and county maintenance departments would have the necessary barricading materials on hand for protection of physical sites.
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		Additional barricading equipment could be available through EMAC and/or IMAC.
TRAINING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		More work needs to be done to understand sectors and critical assets, and to ensure assets that are critical are protected. Once that is completed, additional training needs may be identified for this capability.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		N/A
EXERCISE	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		More work needs to be done to understand sectors and critical assets, and to ensure assets that are critical are protected. Once that is completed, additional exercise needs may be identified for this capability.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		N/A

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CYBERSECURITY

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Protect against damage to, the unauthorized use of, and/or the exploitation of (and, if needed, the restoration of) electronic communications systems and services (and the information contained therein).	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement risk-informed guidelines, regulations, and standards to ensure the security, reliability, confidentiality, integrity and availability of critical information, records, and communications systems and services through collaborative cyber security initiatives and efforts • Implement and maintain procedures to detect malicious activity and to conduct technical and investigative-based countermeasures, mitigations, and operations against malicious actors to counter existing and emerging cyber-based threats, consistent with established protocols 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-2</u> Communications, <u>ESF-5</u> Emergency Management, <u>ESF-13</u> Public Safety & Security, <u>ESF-15</u> External Affairs	
IMPACT	16 sectors (Terrorism- Cyber THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	<p>The Cybersecurity capability occurs throughout the emergency management cycle. Cybersecurity relies on the identification of critical assets in the cyber sector, followed by the implementation of resources to protect those assets.</p> <p>For the most part, holders of cyber assets are assumed responsible for protecting those assets. A vast majority of these assets are held within the private sector. At the state level, the Department of Administrative Services Information Technology Enterprise (DAS-ITE) is responsible for overseeing general information security.</p>	
PLANNING	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		<p>More work needs to be done to identify key systems, nodes and assets in the cyber sector; once identified, protective measures can be identified, prioritized and applied. Impacts to the State and the various “critical” private sector networks need to be studied closer. Interdependencies between these networks also need to be analyzed, to assist with the construction of a more resilient system as well as shorten response and recovery times associated with an attack or system failure.</p> <p>Given this strategy was just written and adopted in 2016, continued refinement of both the strategy and the incident response plan will need to take place. The incorporation of real-world lessons learned and after action findings from local and national exercises should be incorporated where ever possible. Specific functional areas that need to be further developed and incorporated into existing planning efforts include: controlling electronic access, detecting malicious activity, end-user awareness and protective measures.</p>
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Executive Order 87 was signed by the Governor in 2015 that mandates the development of a Cyber Strategy and Cyber Incident Response Plan. Both plans were finalized and formally adopted by the end of 2016.
		NOTES

		<p>The cyber project funded under 2010/2011 is currently 95% deployed, a 45% jump from the 2012 SPR. Remediation efforts are underway, and are working in 36 counties. Since the advent of the cyber risk program, risk scores in participating locations have been dramatically reduced.</p> <p>The Information Technology Sector Plan is completed, which assists the State in understanding the footprint of the cyber sector in the State, understanding criticality of assets, communicating with the cyber sector, and understanding cyber's dependencies on other sectors.</p>
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Regional assessment teams are needed to effectively evaluate threats to critical cyber infrastructure. Regional cyber response teams are necessary to respond to incidents. Work needs to be done to build these regional cyber response teams and incorporate them into the newly created Security Operations Center (2017). Additional work is also needed to locate and connect potential cyber response assets to reduce the impacts of an incident and expedite the response and recovery process.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		The Governor's Cyber Working Group was created to review and guide cyber initiatives within the state. This group also assisted with the development of the cyber strategy along with the cyber incident response plan.
		In 2017, the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) opened the Security Operations Center which will provide monitoring of information security systems that allow for real-time response to information security incidents. This center will combine information from state and federal monitoring systems, cyber intelligence sources and other sources to enable timely decision making.
		NOTES
		N/A
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		DAS-ITE lacks software for effective risk assessments. Lack adequate cyber forensic equipment for incident response. Lack adequate incident tracking software for reporting. Cyber security response teams need outfitted with proper software and equipment. DPS currently has forensics hardware but it is not available for use by external parties.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		The State continues to fund scanning systems and distribute them to other agencies. We currently have 47 counties participating in the Enterprise Vulnerability (EVMS) at the end of 2015.
		NOTES

		DAS-ITE has acquired some forensics equipment, but lacks the ability to effectively deploy it. All of the boxes involved in the cyber risk project have been implemented.
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Training is required in basic response for cyber emergency response team. Need to provide both general training on the basics of a cyber response, and then provide more position-specific training to specialists. Training needs to include information on in-depth cyber forensics. Need to provide basic incident command training as well. Local jurisdictions that currently receive Enterprise Vulnerability Management Software (EVMS) and those who are considering it could use additional outreach from OCIO to highlight benefits.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
N/A		
EXERCISE	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Iowa cybersecurity personnel need to participate in national-level exercises (e.g. FEMA exercise, Cyberstorm). Additional effort is needed to locate and participate in or develop a cyber exercise which includes both public and private responders.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Iowa participated in Cyberstorm 3 and 4. Tabletop exercises are being conducted on basic cyber incidents. Real world events happen every day. After action reports are being developed after each occurrence. In 2017, Iowa participated in a Black Sky tabletop exercise, which looked at the impacts an Electromagnetic Pulse would have on the state's infrastructure.
		NOTES
N/A		

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PHYSICAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Reduce or mitigate risks, including actions targeted at threats, vulnerabilities, and/or consequences, by controlling movement and protecting borders, critical infrastructure, and the homeland.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop, implement and maintain 100% of all physical protections, countermeasures, and policies that protect people, structures, materials, products and systems associated with key operations and critical infrastructure systems. 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-13</u> Public Safety & Security	
IMPACT	16 sectors; multiple assets (River Flooding THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	<p>The Physical Protective Measures capability is predicated on the identification of critical assets, recognition of need to assess those assets and systems for vulnerabilities, and then the ability to fix those vulnerabilities. Iowa maintains a list of assets that meet set criteria to be considered “critical.” This list is constantly reviewed and refined for accuracy, based on changing factors of threat, vulnerability or consequence.</p> <p>Both the public and private sectors have assets or nodes that are considered critical. For the most part, the assets themselves have been responsible for providing physical protective measures when applicable, and take reasonable measures to accomplish this. The State of Iowa has done some work with state assets for target hardening. The Threat Information and Infrastructure Protection Program (TIIPP) conducts vulnerability assessments on critical assets, and provides recommendations for physical protective measures, whether static or dynamic.</p> <p>Another phase of this capability is in physical protective measures in response to an emergency incident, where additional security may be required for a temporary period of time based on specific factors or changes in threat, vulnerability or consequence. If this occurs, public sector plans are in place to provide some level of incident-specific physical protective measures for critical sites; this may also be provided privately by privately-held assets.</p>	
PLANNING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		<p>The State can assess risk, with threat information provided by the Fusion Center, vulnerability and consequence data provided by the Threat Information and Infrastructure Protection Program (TIIPP) and partners. Critical sites must continue to be assessed in order to provide partners with information necessary to make these determinations and provide an accurate picture of vulnerability and consequence. Currently, there are many more assets than can be assessed quickly. A self-led vulnerability assessment toolkit should be identified or created as a tool for private and public sector businesses and assets to assess their own level of vulnerability, with ideas for physical protective measures included. Sample template policies should be developed as part of this process.</p>

		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		The vulnerability assessments done on critical assets provide options and recommendations for physical protective measures. If identified protective measures require emergency resources, ESF 5 (Logistics Management and Resource Support) in both state and local emergency response plans govern how those resources are attained and managed.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		In regard to identifying vulnerabilities, the TIIPP has the capability to do some of this work. Additional staff time is needed to continue to conduct vulnerability assessments and work on the development of a self-led assessment toolkit.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		N/A
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The TIIPP has the necessary equipment to fulfill the mission of measuring vulnerability and consequence. When talking about the protective measures themselves, equipment may be part of fixing specific vulnerabilities and will be on a case by case basis. There is a reliance on both public and private sector critical assets to provide physical protective measures for themselves against both man-made and natural hazards. Iowa will continue to look into possibilities for developing a source of grant funding for critical infrastructure to implement recommendations that fix vulnerabilities.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		N/A
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Relevant state personnel have completed at least some level of vulnerability assessment. Beyond state staff, training for vulnerability assessment is all over the board. A standard training curriculum should be identified and implemented.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A

		NOTES
		Necessary courses could include overall risk reduction, vulnerability assessment and other infrastructure related sources, not just for TIIPP personnel but for partners.
EXERCISE	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Conduct a multi-partner tabletop exercise testing additional vulnerabilities and the effectiveness of implemented protective measures.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		N/A

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RISK MANAGEMENT FOR PROTECTION PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Identify, assess and prioritize risks to inform protection activities and investments.				
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct analysis of each sector and its sector processes, using business continuity methods • Identify all (100%) of scenario-specific critical infrastructure assets. • Assess risk of 100% of identified and high priority assets 				
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-5</u> Emergency Management, <u>ESF-7</u> Logistics & Resource Management, <u>ESF-13</u> Public Safety & Security				
IMPACT	16 sectors; multiple assets; 99 counties (Multiple THIRA scenarios)				
SUMMARY	<p>The Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities capability takes place continuously as the basis for an effective risk management program. This capability is also used for the identification of critical assets, processes and systems on both a static and an incident-specific basis. Risk Management forms the foundation for other critical infrastructure-related capabilities.</p> <p>There is no standard, agreed-upon definition of what makes an asset “critical.” The federal criticality formula, adopted by Iowa, is Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence ($R = T \times V \times C$), though there is no universal scoring table to score the variables. Many larger private businesses have some sort of risk management program in place. This is primarily a business decision, and activities in that program are driven on a financial basis. Local emergency management has lists of critical assets, whether these are provided by HSEMD or self-identified through the hazard mitigation process. The State of Iowa maintains a list of critical assets as well as the federal government.</p> <p>Iowa has an established Threat Information and Infrastructure Protection Program (TIIPP), which relies on the 16 critical sectors identified by the Department of Homeland Security. Within these 16 critical sectors, HSEMD is actively working on identifying points of contact for all, and sector working groups for the lifeline sectors. Additionally, Iowa has the capability to provide on-site vulnerability assessments for critical assets.</p>				
PLANNING	<table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 5%;"></td> <td style="background-color: #f4a460; text-align: center;">GAP DESCRIPTION</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; vertical-align: middle;">2</td> <td> <p>There is no standard definition of what makes an asset “critical.” The federal criticality formula is Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence ($R = T \times V \times C$), though there is no universal scoring table to score the variables. Private businesses may know what is critical to their business practices and processes, but this is driven financially as a business process, not mandated. Local emergency management has lists of critical assets, whether provided by HSEMD, or self-identified through the hazard mitigation process. The State of Iowa has critical asset list that needs to be reviewed annually for accuracy, and to help prioritize protective measures. The criteria used to identify key sites on the Critical Asset List should be established to</p> </td> </tr> </table>		GAP DESCRIPTION	2	<p>There is no standard definition of what makes an asset “critical.” The federal criticality formula is Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence ($R = T \times V \times C$), though there is no universal scoring table to score the variables. Private businesses may know what is critical to their business practices and processes, but this is driven financially as a business process, not mandated. Local emergency management has lists of critical assets, whether provided by HSEMD, or self-identified through the hazard mitigation process. The State of Iowa has critical asset list that needs to be reviewed annually for accuracy, and to help prioritize protective measures. The criteria used to identify key sites on the Critical Asset List should be established to</p>
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		aid in local participation during the update phase. The federal government keeps a list of what they consider critical assets as well. Both state and local lists of critical assets need to be reviewed and validated.
		More work on interdependencies needs to be done, especially in interdependency identification and mitigation throughout the 16 sectors. Four of the sectors have sector-specific plans developed. Much of the work on interdependencies, whether at the state level, or at the single-firm continuity level, focuses on first tier dependencies. More work needs to focus on second and third tier dependencies, as businesses rely on other business for critical services. What do those second tier businesses depend on to function?
		Baseline guidance needs to be developed or identified to assist both public and private sector partners on risk assessment processes.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		The state has prioritized the lifeline sectors as its main focus for critical infrastructure protection and outreach. Although new and emerging threats and attacks will still require the state to engage the remaining 12 sectors.
		NOTES
		Sector planning will be resuming in 2017.
		The private sector does risk management planning for internal processes and facilities.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		A statewide risk management program is a huge undertaking, and the (3) score is reflective of that reality. This capability requires an infusion of dedicated personnel, work and resources.
		Networking needs to be a continued focus. How do the existing partnerships continue to engage new and existing partners, and make sure that the correct businesses and partners are connected? How do those partners stay engaged?
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		All agencies involved in this capability need to continue efforts to engage partners in the public and private sectors for planning and information sharing.
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	N/A	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES

		N/A
		NOTES
		Further research and possible development needs to be done for a system or tool that assists in identification of criticality for an asset. A system should be found or developed that takes dynamic threat, vulnerability and consequence scores, and identifies the highest risk assets during an emergency.
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Different agencies/areas are at different levels of training, and there is no set baseline curriculum for risk management.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
N/A		
EXERCISE	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Different agencies/areas are at different levels of exercise, and there is no set baseline exercise standard for risk management.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
N/A		

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SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRITY AND SECURITY

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Strengthen the security and resilience of the supply chain.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secure and strengthen the resilience of 100% of the key nodes, transportation methods between nodes, and materials in transit between supplier and customer 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-1</u> Transportation, <u>ESF-5</u> Emergency Management, <u>ESF-7</u> Logistics & Resource Management	
IMPACT	16 sectors; multiple nodes (River Flooding THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	<p>The Supply Chain Integrity and Security capability takes place during the protection phase of the emergency management cycle. The capability is predicated on an in-depth understanding of supply chains for different sectors in Iowa and nationally, reviewing those sectors to identify key assets and systems, and then implementing mitigation measures to protect those key assets and systems from damage or attack, or to ensure a measure of resilience for that asset or system’s role in the overall supply chain.</p> <p>Iowa has begun the process of studying the 16 different sectors and identifying key nodes and systems, though at a very high level. The depth of that study varies widely by sector. Iowa has a critical asset list that includes these key nodes and systems based on criticality cascading impacts. This list is used for infrastructure protection planning and response.</p>	
PLANNING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		<p>A process needs to be completed to better understand the different sectors in Iowa, beginning with “lifeline” sectors. Once comprehensive looks at each sector are accomplished, interdependencies within and between sectors need to be studied, culminating in a baseline idea of what the supply chain in Iowa looks like. Through the results of this process, the supply chain can be better understood, and key nodes can be identified. This could lead into a full-scale resiliency program at the local, regional and state levels.</p>
		<p>Some key nodes have been identified via Iowa’s critical asset protection efforts, but this list needs to be validated.</p>
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
NOTES		
<p>Key nodes are identified in Iowa’s critical asset list; the list is continually updated with input from the different critical infrastructure sectors. Specific mitigation, response and recovery missions under this capability would be accomplished under state and local mitigation, emergency response and recovery plans.</p>		
<p>The private sector protects privately held nodes that are key to business practices. The public sector protects publicly held nodes.</p>		
PLANNING	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION	

MUTUAL AID	N/A	N/A
ORGANIZATION	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Continue to engage public and private sector partners in the critical asset assessment process. There are agencies working this issue, but more participation and effort is needed. Work needs to be done to make sure that organizations are not insulated and interact with each other, especially when trying to identify interdependencies and cascading effects.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
Sector points of contact have been established for each of Iowa's identified critical infrastructure sectors; these POCs provide information and input on which nodes are key. Iowa has a response structure in place to clear impacted transportation methods, and equipment in place for interdiction and detection for specific materials if necessary.		
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	N/A	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
N/A		
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	1	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Additional work is needed to identify the current training efforts that exists statewide for this capability.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
While no specific training curriculum exists for this capability, training related to aspects of this capability has been conducted at different levels across the state.		
EXERCISE	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Exercises that test specific supply chain interdependencies and vulnerabilities have been conducted, but a statewide, sector-wide exercise program for interdependencies and vulnerabilities is not in place.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
N/A		



COMMUNITY RESILIENCE

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Lead the integrated effort to recognize, understand, communicate, plan, and address risks so that the community can develop a set of actions to accomplish mitigation and improve resilience.
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that 100% of Iowa’s population is covered by a risk-informed mitigation plan developed through partnerships across the entire community, at both the state and local level, and that these plans are implemented and kept up to date • Know and understand what types of systems the impacted community(s) are present and how to build constructive partnerships between those systems • Build and sustain whole community endeavors through the development and implementation of planning, mitigation, response and recovery actions with the intent of reducing risk and impacts
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-3</u> Public Works & Engineering, <u>ESF-5</u> Emergency Management
IMPACT	3,000,000 people; 99 counties; statewide impact (Multiple THIRA scenarios)
SUMMARY	<p>The Community Resilience capability addresses mitigation efforts within the State and is accomplished through multiple fronts. The first of which is driven by local and State mitigation planning. This effort is a driving force within this capability and a lot of its success is predicated on the thoroughness and quality of those plans. All county emergency management commissions in Iowa are required by Iowa Code 29C to develop a Part B Mitigation plan for their jurisdictions. All 99 of Iowa’s counties are currently covered by a Local Hazard Mitigation Plan. The plans are required to be updated every five years, or after the jurisdiction is declared as a presidential disaster area. Mitigation planning requires public participation. Jurisdictions have historically had different levels of success in getting participation. Communities should be using mitigation plans to drive local mitigation projects, regardless of funding source. Compliant mitigation plans can result in more funding for jurisdictions after a disaster.</p> <p>The second area is through the development of partnerships between the public and private sectors. Through working together and understanding each sector’s strengths and shortfalls, the State as a whole becomes more resilient in the event of a disaster. Some of the key focal areas are sector-specific working groups, key resource and asset identification and continuity planning.</p> <p>Whole community involvement in the planning process also plays into community resilience. This level of involvement attempts to engage the full capacity of the private and non-profit sectors in conjunction with the efforts of the local, state and federal government. By getting all the key players to the table, all the different decision making processes can be utilized during all phases of planning.</p>

PLANNING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		<p>Mitigation planning does take place in every county within the State. However, the quality of the data within these plans varies. There needs to be efforts put forth to refine these plans, as they feed into the State Mitigation Plan. Whole community planning could help strengthen these plans from the local level up. Additional work needs to be done to integrate watershed and regional planning initiatives into existing mitigation and recovery plans.</p> <p>There needs to be more focus on increasing whole community and mitigation planning participation to include businesses, faith-based and disability organizations, the general public and all governmental entities. Work needs to be made on identifying key members at the local and state levels that could assist with these collaborative planning efforts.</p> <p>Another major gap is that flood mapping is not completed, or is very out-of-date across the entire state. Mapping is done at the federal level, and by the Iowa Flood Center, and Iowa does not have a lot of recourse to force the development of these maps.</p>
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		<p>The State Hazard Mitigation Plan is was completed in 2013. It is currently undergoing an update for 2018. Counties are required to develop hazard mitigation plans as part of their Code-specific planning requirements. Local jurisdictions have the option of writing Local Hazard Mitigation Plans for grant funding. Funding to update the required plans is provided by EMPG. Currently, all 99 counties in Iowa are covered under an approved local hazard mitigation plan, though some are coming up on an update phase.</p> <p>The State Mitigation Plan is approved, making Iowa eligible for Hazard Mitigation Grant Program funding. Ongoing mitigation projects, as well as loss avoidance studies, have validated mitigation planning efforts. Counties are required to develop hazard mitigation plans as part of their Code-specific planning requirements. Local jurisdictions have the option of writing Local Hazard Mitigation Plans for grant funding.</p> <p>Mitigation planning requires public participation. Jurisdictions have different levels of success in getting that participation.</p>
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		<p>The network of the State, FEMA, local emergency management and the COGs all participate in mitigation planning. Continue to support the development and incorporation of public/private partnerships beginning at the local level and building upward.</p>
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Iowa has increased oversight of local mitigation plans, and achieved better coordination with FEMA on review of those plans.

		NOTES
		N/A
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	N/A	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
N/A		
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		A continued effort is needed at the local level to educate the importance of mitigation planning and to strengthen the data that is captured through mitigation planning efforts. This requires additional training efforts to educate the community in both whole community and mitigation planning.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
N/A		
EXERCISE	N/A	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
N/A		

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LONG-TERM VULNERABILITY REDUCTION

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Build and sustain resilient systems, communities, and critical infrastructure and key resources lifelines to reduce their vulnerability to natural, technological, and human-caused incidents by lessening the likelihood, severity, and duration of the adverse consequences related to these incidents.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build and sustain resilient systems to reduce vulnerability to 100% of regional hazards and threats through ongoing long-term actions to achieve a measurable reduction in the response and recovery resource requirements of future disasters or incidents • Reduce repetitive damages to public infrastructure, facilities, and private property 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	ESF-3 Public Works & Engineering, ESF-5 Emergency Management, ESF-14 Recovery	
IMPACT	99 counties; 3,000,000 people (Multiple THIRA scenarios)	
SUMMARY	The Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction capability generally takes place before a hazard event, or after an event during the recovery process. It is possible for vulnerability reduction to occur during the response phase as well. Long term vulnerability reduction is achieved on the small scale by projects or processes that make the locality less vulnerable, and the state (as a collection of local jurisdictions) more resilient as a whole.	
PLANNING	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Counties continue to write and update mitigation plans within the five year lifespan. In the coming years, a majority of the county level mitigation plans will require updating, which could affect the scoring of this solution area if they are allowed to fully expire. As of spring 2017, 97 out of 99 counties have active and approved mitigation plans. Within the Iowa Watershed Approach Program, efforts need to be made to coordinate planning efforts with all jurisdictions working within the Watershed Management Authorities (WMAs) and focusing efforts on the implementation of multi-jurisdictional approaches to flood risk reduction.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		The State Hazard Mitigation Plan is complete and approved.
		NOTES
		The State Hazard Mitigation Plan is completed, and is updated every three years. Both the State plan and local plans identify potential mitigation projects for available mitigation funding. Most counties have a finalized mitigation plan in place. The Critical Asset List is a criteria-based accounting of identified critical assets in Iowa, and is used to drive vulnerability assessments on those facilities.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The current scoring of this solution area could change in the upcoming years based on the increased workload of local mitigation plan updates and reviews.

		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management has staff dedicated to mitigation. Local plans are normally completed by the emergency management coordinator of that county, or contracted out to contractors or Councils of Government (COGs).
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	N/A	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		N/A
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		No gap(s) currently identified.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		Training for both Benefit/Cost Analysis and basic Hazard Mitigation Planning is available, and identified personnel have completed this course.
EXERCISE	N/A	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		Loss avoidance studies conducted after disasters show whether vulnerability reduction efforts are producing any results.



RISK AND DISASTER RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Assess risk and disaster resilience so that decision makers, responders, and community members can take informed actions to reduce their entity’s risk and increase their resilience.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Compare and prioritize 100% of the worst case, plausible hazards and threats to the State of Iowa, and assess their impact on the resilience of a variety of communities and jurisdictions 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	ESF-5 Emergency Management	
IMPACT	99 counties; 96 emergency management commissions; statewide (Multiple THIRA scenarios)	
SUMMARY	The Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment capability builds off of the hazards identified in the Threats and Hazard Identification capability. Risk assessments are done during hazard analysis and risk assessments as part of each hazard mitigation plan, whether at the state or local level, and hazards are ranked. The Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) assesses hazards through the prism of worst case scenarios.	
PLANNING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The Iowa Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) provides a hazard-specific, un-prioritized assessment of impacts to the State of Iowa as a whole, and its jurisdictions, depending on the hazard scenario. Some local jurisdictions take worst case scenario planning into account, and some don’t. The development of a local level or regional THIRA process could strengthen planning efforts on all fronts, increasing the jurisdiction’s overall resiliency.
		Additionally, the development of a process or model that identifies interdependencies and relationships among all core capabilities to inform and enhance the decision making process.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		Risk assessments are done during hazard analysis and risk assessments as part of each hazard mitigation plan, whether at the state or local level, and hazards are ranked. The Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) assesses hazards through the prism of worst case scenarios, but doesn’t prioritize them.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The major gap in the organization to implement this capability is found in time and staffing.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES

		Between the State Hazard Mitigation Team, HSEMD planners, county emergency management, and subject matter experts, the structure is in place to implement this capability. However, even with the basic players in place, time and staffing constraints restrict the ability to implement this capability fully.
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	N/A	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		Iowa has HAZUS software available to assist with the implementation of this capability. However, the software isn't used as much as it could be due to the amount of time and training that is required to use the software to its maximum capability. Data limitations also exist within Iowa, though progress is being made statewide.
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Additional training is needed for the use of HAZUS software. A training program for this capability is needed to ensure all partners agree on the best way to assess risk and resilience. Additionally, many people involved in risk management could use additional training on the principles of this subject.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		HSEMD maintains a staff of two employees who are experienced in using the software. Incorporation of the loss estimation software into the State Hazard Mitigation Plan is currently being looked at.
		NOTES
		Explore the possibility of having at least one person trained on HAZUS at the state level to serve as a resource on this system for local emergency managers. HAZUS is specialized knowledge, only occasionally used at the local level.
EXERCISE	N/A	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES



THREATS AND HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Identify the threats and hazards that occur in the geographic area; determine the frequency and magnitude; and incorporate this into analysis and planning processes so as to clearly understand the needs of a community or entity.
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify the worst case, plausible threats and hazards to the State and local jurisdictions, and provide timely and accurate data on these threats and hazards through a continual process of data collection and analysis, in order to form the basis of an emergency management program in accordance with Federal, State and local requirements
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	ESF-5 Emergency Management
IMPACT	99 counties; 96 emergency management commissions; statewide (Extreme Heat THIRA scenario)
SUMMARY	The Threats and Hazard Identification capability is the start of any emergency management planning process. In Iowa, Threats and Hazard Identification is implemented through two main processes, the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA), and the Threat/Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA). Once the hazards are identified, the Threats and Hazards Identification capability leads straight into the Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment capability.
PLANNING	GAP DESCRIPTION
	Federal mitigation guidance for Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) only requires plans to review natural hazards; the inclusion of technological and man-made hazards should be encouraged. In Iowa, all 99 counties are covered by a compliant local hazard mitigation plan, though some counties' plans are due for an update. More work needs to be done to refine the mitigation plans at the county level. Funding to keep these plans up-to-date could be an issue in the future, as a large portion of them were funded using Hazard Mitigation funds from DR-1763 (2008).
	The Threat/Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) reviews hazards based on worst-case scenarios, but is only required to be completed at the State level. The State's THIRA is reviewed on an annual basis and updated as needed.
	RECENT ADVANCES
	As of 2017, two of the 99 counties are undergoing plan updates. However, beginning in 2018, a lot of the plans will be hitting the five year mark, requiring an update. The 2013 State Hazard Mitigation Plan is currently under and update phase. During the update phase, the HARA portion of the plan will be re-analyzed, potentially to involve more technological and man-made hazards in the process. The completed plan should take effect in 2018.
NOTES	
	THIRA is only required at the state level. The THIRA is based partially on the hazard analysis and risk assessment found in the State of Iowa Hazard Mitigation Plan. Once the framework of the THIRA is complete, continual

		<p>data collection, analysis and improvement will need to occur. The THIRA provides Iowa-specific worst case threat data.</p> <p>The Iowa Emergency Management Association recommends the inclusion of technological and man-made hazards into a complete HARA during the Emergency Managers Professional Development Course for local emergency managers on plan development. There is no federal or state requirement or regulation to include these hazards. The HARA in hazard mitigation planning also does not explicitly require planning to the worst case scenario for each hazard. A starting list of possible hazards to review is provided, with hazards then picked at the planners' discretion.</p> <p>It is important to remember that both the HARA and the THIRA are different pieces of threat and hazard identification. The HARA provides general information about each hazard that could affect a jurisdiction; the THIRA provides capability-specific evaluation of worst-case scenarios.</p>
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		It can be difficult to get stakeholder participation for a mitigation planning process. Inclusion of stakeholders into the THIRA process needs to continue to advance, with the inclusion of private sector partners. Universal participation by stakeholders in these processes would raise this score to a 5.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Partners/subject matter experts for each of the capabilities assessed during the THIRA and Stakeholder Preparedness Review process were identified, and participated in the development of the document. The identification of subject matter experts and the involvement of new partners in the THIRA process continues to evolve and be more inclusive.
		NOTES
THIRA is only required at the state level, guided by CPG 201. The methodology on how to write a good mitigation plan is available.		
Multiple agencies and levels of government are involved in the development of the THIRA. Local mitigation plans are created with input at the county and city level. Development of mitigation plans is extremely reliant on contractors and grant money. There is a constant struggle to get people to participate in mitigation planning processes.		
The HARA in the State Hazard Mitigation Plan is updated every three years, or after a disaster declaration. Guidance for mitigation planning is derived from 44 CFR Subpart 201. Local hazard mitigation plans are updated every five years, or after a disaster declaration.		
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	3	GAP DESCRIPTION

		Technology tools to assist in these processes need to be identified, and access to those tools needs to be addressed statewide.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and HAZUS can be used in this capability. Access to GIS and HAZUS capabilities are very limited in many areas. There may be a need expand this capability at a regional/state level to make it more cost effective; this option needs further study as a method to close this gap.
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Identify what risk assessment training is available, and review training needs statewide to ensure risk management is integrated into local planning operations. Training needs to focus on integrating risk management into operations, as part of an overall comprehensive emergency management program.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		The emergency management program development course covers risk assessment, but is not in-depth or comprehensive. The development of a mentoring guide for the Emergency Management Professional Development course should help to increase practical skills in this area and the knowledge level of emergency managers should be evaluated after the implementation of the mentoring program.
EXERCISE	N/A	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		N/A

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INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Stabilize critical infrastructure functions, minimize health and safety threats, and efficiently restore and revitalize systems and services to support a viable, resilient community.					
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within 30 day(s) of an incident, restore service to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 282,472 customers without water service ○ 249,240 customers without wastewater service ○ 66,464 customers without communication service ○ 332,320 customers without power service • Within 24 hours, complete a utility impact survey to understand the severity of the event’s impacts on the various utility systems. Establish a restoration prioritization plan in conjunction with the impacted utility providers • Within 24 hours, decrease and stabilize immediate infrastructure threats to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The impacted population, to include survivors in the heavily damaged zone; ○ Nearby communities that may be affected by cascading events; ○ Mass care support facilities and evacuation processing centers with a focus on life-sustainment and congregate care services • Provide systems that meet the community needs while minimizing service disruption during restoration within the specified timeline in the recovery plan • Within 30 days, re-establish critical infrastructure within the affected areas to support ongoing emergency response operations, life sustainment, community functionality and transition to recovery 					
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-3</u> Public Works & Engineering, <u>ESF-14</u> Recovery					
IMPACT	16 critical sectors; high level critical assets (Winter Storm THIRA scenario)					
SUMMARY	The Infrastructure Systems capability occurs after an incident, and focuses on identifying critical systems related to safety that are affected, and then initiating response and immediate recovery operations to restore those systems to their previous operating capacity. This process is guided by company procedures, State and local response plans, and in interaction and partnership with the 16 infrastructure sectors. For the most part, private and public sector infrastructure partners already have plans in place for base level repair to proprietary infrastructure systems. Both the public and private sectors may rely on each other to reconstitute infrastructure systems as quickly as possible.					
PLANNING	2	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="2" data-bbox="529 1583 1425 1625"> GAP DESCRIPTION </th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td data-bbox="529 1625 618 1839"></td> <td data-bbox="618 1625 1425 1839"> Planning for this capability is better in some areas than others, specifically in the development of sector plans. Additional effort is needed to update existing sector plans along with the creation of new ones to eventually cover all 16 sectors. Information held within these sector plans should also be incorporated into as many planning efforts as possible. Outreach to the county emergency managers needs to continue, through critical infrastructure planning and further development and refinement of </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	GAP DESCRIPTION			Planning for this capability is better in some areas than others, specifically in the development of sector plans. Additional effort is needed to update existing sector plans along with the creation of new ones to eventually cover all 16 sectors. Information held within these sector plans should also be incorporated into as many planning efforts as possible. Outreach to the county emergency managers needs to continue, through critical infrastructure planning and further development and refinement of
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		the Infrastructure Systems Recovery Support Function (RSF5) at the state and local levels.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		In 2017, the formation of the Catastrophic Planning Working group took place. This working group's focus is on the partnerships between the public and private sectors and the dependencies (both known and unknown) between all members. The goal of this group is to increase planning efforts to encompass catastrophic events and to build public and private sector partnerships to increase statewide resiliency.
		NOTES
		Planning for the activities to respond to and recover from affects to critical infrastructure systems is contained in the State Emergency Response Plan and its ESFs. Existing sector plans contain information on what can make systems within each sector critical; true criticality is only measured when taking into account current situations.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Continue outreach with points of contact in Iowa's 16 sectors. Continue to find ways to incorporate the private sector and other sector partners into overall disaster response and recovery at all levels.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Outreach is ongoing through the Catastrophic Planning Work Group.
		NOTES
The organization to provide response to incidents is in place. Sector points of contact for each of Iowa's 16 sectors have been identified, and they are invaluable in providing State and local responders with a deeper level of understanding of each sector. Points of contact from each sector are available for consultation during disaster response and recovery.		
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Currently, equipment needs are basically being met. However, once more assessment is done at the sector level, new equipment needs may be identified.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
Iowa uses a "just in time" resource management methodology to provide resources where needed.		
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		When it comes to re-establishing damage infrastructure, front line personnel with specific skill sets are usually very well trained in

		reconstituting specific systems. More training needs to be provided at both public and private sectors about activities necessary to reconstitute specific critical systems.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Continue to locate specialized training to assist with the incorporation of infrastructure system elements into planning, training and exercise efforts.
		NOTES
		Response assets are trained in their respective response capabilities.
EXERCISE	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		There is no set exercise program for this capability. Exercises focusing on infrastructure restoration are done across the state, albeit on an ad hoc basis. More effort needs to be put into getting other organizations involved in the exercise process, and to exercise this capability on a larger scale.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Continue efforts with the catastrophic planning workgroup.
		NOTES
		Responses that include an infrastructure systems component are exercised regularly. Iowa doesn't exercise recovery.

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CRITICAL TRANSPORTATION

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within 72 hours, establish the capacity to provide physical access through appropriate transportation corridors and deliver required resources to save lives and to meet the needs of disaster survivors 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-1</u> Transportation, <u>ESF-7</u> Logistics & Resource Management	
IMPACT	4 transportation sites (Radiological Incident THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	The Critical Transportation capability ensures that Iowa's transportation infrastructure is rapidly re-opened after a disaster.	
PLANNING	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		In recent years, collaboration between the Iowa Department of Transportation and the Iowa State Patrol has been ramped up, resulting in shared planning, training and exercise.
		NOTES
		The Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) has a statewide emergency operations group which handles day-to-day response activities. This group provides real time situational awareness which assists in decision making and response activities. DOT has standard operating procedures and policies in place for specific emergency transportation-related actions (e.g. interstate road closures), that are driven by Iowa Code and DOT policies. General emergency activities for both state and local transportation activities are governed under state and local emergency operations plans.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Gaps exist in coordination between the state DOT and county/city public works departments during an incident.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		More integration between DOT and the Iowa Department of Public Safety has occurred in the past year, and ensures that the DOT EOC and law enforcement have response transparency and are sharing information.
		NOTES
		Between the DOT Emergency Operations Center (EOC), county public works, county and state emergency management, law enforcement at all levels and the Iowa National Guard, the organization is in place to implement activities under this capability.
ORGANIZATION		MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION

MUTUAL AID	N/A	The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and the Iowa Mutual Aid Compact (IMAC) are available as mechanisms to procure/provide necessary resources through mutual aid.
EQUIPMENT	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The DOT has baseline communication systems beyond their own department, but needs to develop more interoperability with first responders in order to ensure they can communicate in times of crisis.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
Always researching new and innovative equipment to better respond to everyday events as well as disaster. During an emergency where equipment is needed that goes beyond what the DOT already has on-hand, procurement can either be done through Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management, or DOT can do this themselves through existing contracts.		
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	5	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and the Iowa Mutual Aid Compact (IMAC) are available as mechanisms to procure/provide necessary resources through mutual aid.
TRAINING	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Continue to educate emergency management personnel regarding the regulatory waivers and exemptions that exist, how to request them, and what the triggering mechanisms are for each of them.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		1500 DOT employees have received some level of NIMS training in the past year, appropriate to position-specific needs. In the last year, collaboration between the Iowa Department of Transportation and the Iowa State Patrol has been ramped up, resulting in shared planning, training and exercise.
		NOTES
N/A		
EXERCISE	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Have had several major events and currently going through an AAR process which may bump this rating up to a (5).
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Because Iowa has experienced many disasters in the past few years, real events have been used for the improvement of plans. In the last year, collaboration between the Iowa Department of Transportation and the Iowa State Patrol has been ramped up, resulting in shared planning, training and exercise.
		NOTES
N/A		



ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE AND HEALTH AND SAFETY

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Within 24 hours from initial notification, conduct hazard assessments, and disseminate guidance and resources to support environmental health and safety actions for response personnel and the affected population Ensure that all signatories to the National Incident Management System (NIMS) comply with NIMS Responder Safety Guidelines 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-5</u> Emergency Management, <u>ESF-8</u> Public Health & Medical, <u>ESF-10</u> Hazmat	
IMPACT	Multiple hazardous materials incidents; multiple damaged sites (Animal Disease THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	<p>The Environmental Response and Health Safety capability covers both hazardous materials response and basic first responder safety during the course of an incident.</p> <p>Initial hazardous materials response is conducted by local first responders. The local responder should know how to recognize a hazardous materials incident, and basic response actions to handle immediate life safety needs, and to secure the scene. Local responders will continue to be on scene, and play key roles in supporting the hazardous materials team throughout the course of the incident.</p> <p>Hazardous materials response capability is not universal across the State; currently, 6 counties have no consistent hazmat coverage in place. Many counties contract with local departments in other jurisdictions; others contract with private companies. The Iowa Mutual Aid Compact (IMAC) could be used to share hazardous materials capabilities across jurisdictional lines, but the agreement of both parties would be required.</p> <p>Iowa has also provided funding to six hazardous materials teams (three response teams and three tactical teams) with an enhanced capability to respond to WMD incidents anywhere across the state. While the response footprint is statewide for WMD incidents, these teams do not provide statewide coverage for normal hazardous materials responses.</p> <p>The National Incident Management System (NIMS) includes responder safety guidelines as part of the overall system. Any jurisdiction that adopts NIMS is required to follow these guidelines.</p>	
PLANNING	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Plans exist but are constantly being updated, which makes it difficult to exercise plans in a timely manner. Planning is continually improving based on exercise results. Additional efforts are needed to continue to promote

		additional industry participation within the Local Emergency Planning Commissions (LEPCs).
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Nearly all counties are covered by basic hazardous materials response teams; currently, six counties have no coverage. The State operates a hazardous materials response capability for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. In order to attain the highest rating in organization, areas that don't have coverage under a regular hazmat response team would be required to get it.
		Local Emergency Planning Commissions need to be reviewed to ensure greater industry participation. An effort needs to be made to include more private industry participation, including both fixed facilities and transportation assets.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Hazardous materials coverage continues to improve across the state.
		NOTES
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Teams across the state have the necessary equipment. However, due to the service life, much of the standard equipment will soon need to be replaced. Planning needs to be done to phase out old equipment with new across all Hazmat teams.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Through HSGP 2016, the State has allocated funding to purchase advanced technology to increase analytical detection of hazardous substances (four units planned).
		NOTES
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		There are no specific training deficiencies at this time, but because of turnover and the need for refresher training, training is always behind. Due to schedules and budgets, it is sometimes difficult for responders to attend needed training. Responders not involved with a hazardous materials team need to continually train on how to respond to hazmat incidents.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A

		NOTES
		N/A
EXERCISE	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		In order to reach the highest rating in this solution area, responders from multiple disciplines need to be brought together for a major exercise focusing on a hazardous materials incident. The score recognizes that hazardous materials training needs to reach beyond established hazmat teams. Local responders need to be trained to basic hazmat operations levels, even if they do not reach the full hazardous materials operator certification.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		The use of the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) has helped define exercise objectives.
		NOTES
		N/A

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FATALITY MANAGEMENT SERVICES

<p>CAPABILITY DEFINITION</p>	<p>Provide fatality management services, including body recovery and victim identification, working with state and local authorities to provide temporary mortuary solutions, sharing information with mass care services for the purpose of reunifying family members and caregivers with missing persons/remains, and providing counseling to the bereaved.</p>				
<p>CAPABILITY TARGETS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within six hours, establish and conduct operations to recover/collect fatalities • Within 24 hour(s) of an incident, complete the recovery, identification, and mortuary services, including temporary storage services, for 100 fatalities • Within 72 hours, establish operations to process remains across the affected area and establish a process and location(s) for families to gather and begin the re-unification process 				
<p>IDENTIFIED ESF(S)</p>	<p><u>ESF-8</u> Public Health & Medical</p>				
<p>IMPACT</p>	<p>420,000 fatalities over 1 year across 99 counties (Public Health THIRA scenario); 200 fatalities at once (Tornado THIRA scenario)</p>				
<p>SUMMARY</p>	<p>The Fatality Management Services capability is considered to take place between the time an incident occurs that causes fatalities to the disposition of those fatalities to a funeral home, or other mortuary services.</p> <p>Iowa has a centralized state medical examiner system. The Iowa Office of the State Medical Examiner (IOSME) provides training, education and consultation services (investigations / forensic autopsy) to county medical examiner offices across the state. Basic fatality management services are routinely provided by county medical examiner offices in each of the 99 counties. No matter the number of fatalities, the process is essentially the same – local responders secure the body until the county medical examiner (ME) arrives. Upon arrival, the ME will take custody of the body, confirm identification, determine the need for autopsy, and certify the cause and manner of death. If an autopsy is necessary, the decedent will be transported to a morgue facility where an autopsy will be performed. If an autopsy is not necessary, the decedent will be released to a funeral home of the next-of-kin’s choosing for final disposition directly from the death scene.</p> <p>When the number of fatalities exceeds a jurisdiction’s resource capabilities, it is considered a mass fatalities incident. During these types of incidents, the Office of the State Medical Examiner will be consulted to provide strategic and operational oversight in investigating the deaths and may request that additional resources be brought in to assist local responders. Iowa has developed the Iowa Mortuary Operations Team for mass fatality incidents.</p>				
<p>PLANNING</p>	<table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 5%;"></td> <td style="background-color: #f4a460; text-align: center;">GAP DESCRIPTION</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">2</td> <td>Review local planning for mass fatalities during a local response. Not every county in Iowa has a specific mass fatalities plan in place. Specific</td> </tr> </table>		GAP DESCRIPTION	2	Review local planning for mass fatalities during a local response. Not every county in Iowa has a specific mass fatalities plan in place. Specific
	GAP DESCRIPTION				
2	Review local planning for mass fatalities during a local response. Not every county in Iowa has a specific mass fatalities plan in place. Specific				

		planning shortfalls are mortuary services and handling body recovery for multiple fatalities.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		The Iowa Mortuary Operations Team (IMORT) is in place. The IMORT functions under the State Medical Examiner/Iowa Department of Public Health, with capabilities to operate with other specialty teams already in place, such as the Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), Public Health Response Team (PHRT), etc. Look at creating a basic mass fatality plan available for all local level jurisdictions that currently do not have one.
		NOTES
		The Iowa Office of The State Medical Examiner (IOSME) has policies, plans, and procedures in place and validated by exercises/operations. If a mass fatalities event was to occur, IOSME is prepared to respond and handle a mass fatalities incident. The IOSME is accredited by the National Association of Medical Examiners. Mass fatalities planning is covered under ESF 8 in state and local emergency operations plans, which are updated every five years.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Currently the IOSME is recruiting additional volunteer members for IMORT. Every county has investigators. Every county contracts with a medical examiner, but multiple counties may contract with the same person. In a widespread incident with many fatalities across a wide area, this capability would quickly be stretched beyond capacity.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		This area is difficult to build capability in, given its specialized requirements. There isn't a lot of redundancy within the state.
		NOTES
	The mass fatalities capability is implemented by a network of medical examiners, public health personnel, and private funeral homes. The IMORT is still in search of additional volunteers to supplement the current 45 member team. Previously IMORT was developed and some training was provided	
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	5	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		If necessary, additional personnel can be requested through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and the Iowa Mutual Aid Compact (IMAC). FEMA Region 7 has a Disaster Mortuary Operations Team (DMORT).
EQUIPMENT	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The IMORT has the necessary equipment to process fatalities through the central facility in Ankeny. However, funding is needed if remains are to be processed in the field in a temporary morgue including wall structures, computer/imaging equipment, office equipment/supplies, decontamination equipment and trailer/transport capabilities. Agreements are in place with local hazardous materials teams to provide

		fatality decontamination. However, if those teams are busy with response, it may necessitate the need for additional equipment.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		If remains are to be processed at its central facility in Ankeny, Iowa, only sustainment needs would be required, and systems are in place to fulfill these needs. In conjunction with mass fatality planning, look at the basic level of equipment needed to recover and process higher numbers of casualties.
		NOTES
		N/A
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	5	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		If necessary, additional equipment can be requested through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and the Iowa Mutual Aid Compact (IMAC).
TRAINING	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The Iowa Office of The State Medical Examiner currently is staffed with personnel certified by their respective professional organizations. Annual training is conducted by the IOSME for the IMORT Team. Additional involvement in more exercises with county officials is encouraged.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Iowa's Office of The State Medical Examiner maintains training and accreditation standards through the appropriate professional associations under which they operate.
		NOTES
N/A		
EXERCISE	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The Iowa Office of The State Medical Examiner actively participates in training/exercises ranging from table top to hands-on practical applications (recovery techniques) and consultations with county officials during county exercises. Many local assets across the state do not currently exercise mass fatality incidents.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Look at the incorporation of a mass casualty element into existing exercises to bring this issue to the forefront and kick-start the planning process.
		NOTES
N/A		

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FIRE MANAGEMENT AND SUPPRESSION

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Provide structural, wildland, and specialized firefighting capabilities to manage and suppress fires of all types, kinds and complexities while protecting the lives, property, and the environment in the affected area.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Within 24 hour(s) of an incident, conduct firefighting operations to suppress and extinguish 385 structure fires Provide traditional first response or initial firefighting services Conduct expanded or extended firefighting and support operations through coordinated response of fire management and specialized fire suppression resources Ensure the coordinated deployment of appropriate local, regional and statewide management and fire suppression resources and/or training to reinforce firefighting efforts and maintain an appropriate level of protection for subsequent fires 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	ESF-4 Firefighting	
IMPACT	Multiple fire departments and volunteer firefighters mobilized (Grass/Wild Land Fire THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY		
PLANNING	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Plans for the existing capabilities are in place. However, plans for specific SOPs need to be reviewed and updated on a regular basis. Additional planning needs to take place regarding specialized firefighting and extended attack firefighting. Some planning has taken place in the larger metropolitan areas such as Des Moines and Cedar Rapids but more work needs to be done in these areas to look at how smaller departments could support full time departments in this area.
		Planning across all jurisdictions could potentially be improved through regional collaboration facilitated through county emergency managers.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Review existing plans and identify specific annexes and identify those that would be the most beneficial to develop.
		NOTES
N/A		
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Staffing statewide is fairly consistent and stable. However, issues do begin to arise in the smaller jurisdictions when it comes to specialized firefighting and extended attack firefighting, due to their volunteer nature. Larger jurisdictions are also impacted by these gaps, just not to the same degree.

		Increase mutual aid agreements with neighboring communities/counties.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Identify ways to bolster and increase mutual aid agreements with as many jurisdictions as possible.
		NOTES
	N/A	
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Equipment statewide exists to address the common fire types. Though each jurisdiction specializes to address their own common fire types, which can leave them vulnerable to others (ex. Larger jurisdictions do not maintain the capability to fight wildland fires, given their mostly urban environment). To increase the capability statewide, more uniform equipment needs to be maintained. It should also be noted that some of the larger jurisdictions do not have the capability to address some of the "specialized" fire incidents (ex. high-rise fires). The amount of equipment statewide is adequate for wildland firefighting, airport firefighting but if an incident happened at a smaller airport it would tax local resources as most departments don't carry a lot of firefighting foam or have training in fighting aircraft fires.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Evaluate specialized firefighting equipment deficiencies statewide and evaluate the probability of use if purchased.
		NOTES
		N/A
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		There is not a lot of training done on wildland firefighting except for the DNR crews that get tasked with prescribed burns across the state. There is also not a lot of training on aircraft firefighting done across the state only for departments for which that is their primary mission not for the supporting departments that would be called in to assist with that type of operation.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Identify the training deficiencies among some of the larger fire departments and attempt to identify ways to incorporate needed training into future training schedules.
		NOTES
	N/A	
EXERCISE	3	GAP DESCRIPTION

		<p>There are not a lot of exercises done across the state only the required triennial FAA requirement for the larger airports. There are also not a lot of exercises that focus on wildland firefighting across the state.</p>
		<p>RECENT ADVANCES</p>
		<p>Currently, training exercises/opportunities exist generally when a fire department acquires a structure (typically an abandoned residential dwelling), abates the asbestos, and preps the structure in accordance with NFPA 1403. Prepping acquired structures is expensive, time consuming, and are a one-time training opportunity.</p> <p>Evaluate exercise needs and attempt to incorporate them into upcoming exercise schedules as allowed.</p>
		<p>NOTES</p>
		N/A

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LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Deliver essential commodities, equipment, and services in support of impacted communities and survivors, to include emergency power and fuel support, as well as the coordination of access to community staples. Synchronize logistics capabilities and enable the restoration of impacted supply chains.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Within 24 hour(s) of an incident, identify and mobilize governmental, non-governmental and private sector life-sustaining commodities, resources, and services to 36,392 people requiring shelter and 36,392 people requiring food and water. Maintain distribution system for 1 week Within 24 hours, establish and utilize a system/process to track and coordinate all governmental, non-governmental and private sector resources within and outside of the impacted area(s) Within 24 hours of initial event onset, begin to establish a fuel distribution and prioritization plan to ensure that key lifeline sectors and life-safety missions receive and continue to receive needed fuel for the duration of the event Train two personnel per local emergency management commission that can effectively manage local resources and who can serve as a point of contact for the State EOC 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	ESF-1 Transportation, ESF-3 Public Works & Engineering, ESF-7 Logistics & Resource Management, ESF-12 Energy	
IMPACT	16 sectors; 99 counties; 3,000,000 people (Radiological Incident THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	<p>The Logistics and Supply Chain Management capability is implemented throughout the disaster cycle, from mitigation through recovery. This process is guided by ESF 7 (Logistics Management and Resources Support) in state and local emergency operations plans.</p> <p>Locally, jurisdictions rely on internal resources, the private sector and mutual aid to fill resource needs. The state has a structure in place to provide needed resources during times of disaster. The State EOC is set up to provide resource support across the State, with the support structure found within the Critical Infrastructure Protection Program. This program relies on the partnerships built within all 16 sectors to assist with resource identification needs and to provide access to critical resources in times of need. Iowa uses a just in time resource procurement methodology.</p> <p>Iowa is a signatory to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. By law, counties participate in the Iowa Mutual Aid Compact for inter- and intra-state mutual aid, providing a framework for quickly exchanging resources when necessary.</p>	
PLANNING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		An ESF for resource management is included in current state and local emergency operations plans. Use of Comprehensive Preparedness Guidance (CPG) 101 standards will make State and local plans more detailed in response capabilities and response planning. A review needs to be completed on the need for more resource MOUs at the local level. Acceptance and use of private services is being incorporated into some

		<p>jurisdictions’ resource plans, and this trend should be implemented statewide. This capability is included under ESF 7 (Logistics Management and Resource Support) in both the State and county emergency response plans.</p> <p>At a state and local level, a resource inventory that meets the needs of all partners needs to be developed to assist in the identification and location of what resources are available during an incident. This inventory needs to be maintained in a localized database at the State Emergency Operations Center for efficient emergency response and recovery efforts. The inventory needs to cover local resources, state resources and private sector resources. The development of a resource management tool/process is needed to assist with statewide resource management efforts. All county emergency management agencies should continue to be incorporated into overall planning processes at the local and state level tying private sector resources to emergency response.</p>
		RECENT ADVANCES
		<p>Review existing MOUs present in ESF 7 and identify potential new partner agencies/businesses. Look at incorporating some sort of resource management tool into existing planning efforts to assist with real-time resource tracking.</p>
		NOTES
		N/A
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		<p>Depth at the local level for resource management is needed. The goal is to have 1-3 people from local or county government agencies who are cleared and vetted. These individuals need to be proficient in resource management, the use of WebEOC, function as the main resource coordinating body during an event and serve as the point of contact for the State EOC and other surrounding EOCs.</p>
		RECENT ADVANCES
		<p>Work towards identifying specific shortfalls at the state and local EOCs regarding logistics.</p>
		NOTES
		<p>The state has a structure in place to provide needed resources during times of disaster. The State EOC is set up to provide assets across the State, with partnerships in place with State agencies.</p> <p>Iowa is a participant in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, and counties participate in the Iowa Mutual Aid Compact for inter- and intra-state mutual aid, providing a framework for quickly exchanging resources when necessary.</p>
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		<p>Equipment needs for resource management and commonly needed resources should be reviewed at the local level.</p>

		The State of Iowa does not maintain a standing cache of commonly used equipment. More study needs to be done on whether this cache is necessary.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		Iowa utilizes a "just in time" resource methodology. Iowa has contracts or agreements in place with multiple partners to provide public/private services when necessary, and has a process in place to purchase necessary items that aren't on-hand.
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Required training to fill this gap includes educating SEOC and local EOC staff in logistics management. Refresher training and training of new personnel will be a continuous requirement.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Identify specific logistics management training courses that could benefit EOC staff.
		NOTES
		Partners that provide the specific resources/capabilities provide their own training on that resource. They are expected to be able to operate the capability, if deployed.
EXERCISE	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Iowa has had several real world events that have tested plans and processes for resource management. Plans should be updated and/or validated based on the after action reports of these events.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Evaluate current plans and identify ways to integrate exercise efforts to test validity.
		NOTES
		N/A

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MASS CARE SERVICES

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Provide life-sustaining services to affected populations with a focus on hydration, feeding, and sheltering to those who have the most need, as well as support for re-unifying families.
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within four hours of an incident, tend to immediate life and temporary protective sheltering needs of affected population. Transition to mobilizing and delivering resources and capabilities to meet the needs of disaster survivors, including at-risk individuals and establish, staff and equip emergency shelters and other temporary housing (including accessible housing) options for the impacted population within 24 hours • Within 24 hours of an incident, provide emergency sheltering, food, and water for 36,392 people requiring shelter and 36,392 people requiring food and water, including 728 people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible shelter) and 728 people with access and functional needs (requiring food and water), and 9,029 animals requiring shelter, food, and water. Maintain for 1 week • Within 24 hours of an incident, move 5,459 people requiring temporary, non-congregate housing, including 109 people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible, temporary, non-congregate housing), from congregate care to temporary housing • Within 24 hours of an incident, establish a reunification process at shelters and community centers to facilitate prompt and efficient family reunification • Within 24 hours of an incident, mobilize and deliver resources and capabilities to meet the needs of the disaster survivors' pets • Within 60 days, move from congregate care to non-congregate alternatives, relocation assistance, or temporary housing solutions for families unable to return to their pre-disaster homes
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-6</u> Mass Care, <u>ESF-8</u> Public Health & Medical
IMPACT	Shelter/care for 37,691 persons (expected shelter rate 5% - approx. 2,000 people)- (Radiological Incident THIRA scenario)
SUMMARY	<p>The Mass Care Services capability is considered to take place between the occurrence of an incident (no previous warning), or a warning of an incident occurrence (when applicable), set up of sheltering capabilities and immediate and mid-term sheltering needs, and the transition from temporary mass care solutions to more stable housing.</p> <p>Immediately after an incident (within four hours), immediate life safety and sheltering needs will be handled by local jurisdictions. While communities should have lists of available spaces useable for shelters, this could be as simple as moving affected populations and sheltering them in any available space away from the elements – a community bus, a fire station, or any vacant space until a more formal sheltering system could be set up.</p>

	<p>As initial life safety needs are being met, communities will also begin opening longer-term “traditional” shelters (within 24 hours). This may be done in conjunction with the American Red Cross (ARC keeps a list of local shelters). These will be sites that offer functional needs access and basic needs (food, cots, etc.). Equipment and staff to run these shelters is provided in partnership between the ARC and local assets. Regional mass care trailers are available to provide equipment upon request. The State of Iowa may be asked to supplement local response by providing equipment (most likely by purchasing through existing state or federal contracts), or by providing state services. Per the State of Iowa Response Plan, the Department of Human Services is the lead agency for mass care. If necessary, federal assistance would be expected within 72 hours. After immediate, short-term and mid-term needs have been met (within 60 days), the Mass Care Services capability transitions into longer term care capabilities, including Housing, and Health and Social Services.</p>		
<p>PLANNING</p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td data-bbox="456 709 532 1108"> <p>2</p> </td> <td data-bbox="532 709 1430 1577"> <p style="text-align: center;">GAP DESCRIPTION</p> <p>Annexes tied to ESF 6 (Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services) are lacking required elements beyond basic equipment deployment. Specialized equipment/services (wrap-around services) are not sufficiently addressed universally across the state. Examples include specialized equipment needs, medical needs, laundry and security. When reviewing current plans that deal with mass care, there needs to be a refocus on small scale sheltering needs and the deficiencies identified at the local level first and foremost.</p> <p>Family unification planning is a specific planning shortfall. This especially needs to be address at schools.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">RECENT ADVANCES</p> <p>Evaluate existing mass care plans (ESF6) and ensure the inclusion of specialized equipment within the plan. Additional planning efforts are needed to detail the handling of pets.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">NOTES</p> <p>There is an Emergency Support Function (ESF) in the State Emergency Operations Plan called "Mass Care" - this ESF is also a required element of local plans. The Iowa Disaster Human Resource Council has established an ESF 6/Functional Needs Committee to assist with planning.</p> <p>There is a self-reporting program for citizens that have functional needs. This program needs to be strengthened, as that information could prove critical when opening up a sheltering facility. It is illegal to get this information unless it is voluntarily provided.</p> </td> </tr> </table>	<p>2</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">GAP DESCRIPTION</p> <p>Annexes tied to ESF 6 (Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services) are lacking required elements beyond basic equipment deployment. Specialized equipment/services (wrap-around services) are not sufficiently addressed universally across the state. Examples include specialized equipment needs, medical needs, laundry and security. When reviewing current plans that deal with mass care, there needs to be a refocus on small scale sheltering needs and the deficiencies identified at the local level first and foremost.</p> <p>Family unification planning is a specific planning shortfall. This especially needs to be address at schools.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">RECENT ADVANCES</p> <p>Evaluate existing mass care plans (ESF6) and ensure the inclusion of specialized equipment within the plan. Additional planning efforts are needed to detail the handling of pets.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">NOTES</p> <p>There is an Emergency Support Function (ESF) in the State Emergency Operations Plan called "Mass Care" - this ESF is also a required element of local plans. The Iowa Disaster Human Resource Council has established an ESF 6/Functional Needs Committee to assist with planning.</p> <p>There is a self-reporting program for citizens that have functional needs. This program needs to be strengthened, as that information could prove critical when opening up a sheltering facility. It is illegal to get this information unless it is voluntarily provided.</p>
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		operations periods – not everyone has the capability to backfill sheltering needs for more than a few operational periods.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Look at identifying ways to increase the availability of staff for backfill purposes during extended duration events.
		NOTES
		Between Department of Human Services, the Red Cross, the Iowa Disaster Behavioral Response Team, the Iowa Disaster Human Resource Council and the Salvation Army, the organizational structure is in place to provide mass care to Iowans. Traditional partners in sheltering and mass care have experienced organizational changes in the past few years that have may affected their ability to provide the same level of support as in the past. Generally, initial sheltering works across the state. During longer operations, backfill of properly trained personnel capable of running shelters may become an issue, due to a lack of depth.
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Iowa relies on partner organizations to provide basic sheltering needs. These NGO's include Red Cross, Salvation Army, faith-based organizations, etc. Counties have different types/levels of equipment on-hand. If more equipment is needed for mass care, it can be procured through mutual aid, or be purchased under Iowa's "just in time" resource management protocols. An in-depth system for inventory and location of equipment for mass care across Iowa needs to be developed, along with a system for deployment that offers real-time tracking. There is no baseline level of equipment for mass care across the state.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		N/A
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	1	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Because of personnel turnover, it is difficult to maintain proper training for mass care services. Training requirements need to be developed so additional partners can be provided with the necessary training to run shelter operations, and provide for backfill depending on incident duration.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Address the stability of personnel first. Then identify appropriate a training plan moving forward.
		NOTES
		N/A

EXERCISE	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Mass care is not universally exercised across the state; more exercises focused on the provision of mass care are needed.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Continue to look at ways to integrate a mass care element into upcoming exercise efforts.
		NOTES
		AARs of major incidents are being reviewed and considered in the updating of plans.



MASS SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Deliver traditional and atypical search and rescue capabilities, including personnel, services, animals, and assets to survivors in need, with the goal of saving the greatest number of endangered lives in the shortest time possible.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within 3 hours of initial request for assistance, identify the need for specialized search and rescue equipment or personnel and begin the mobilization process to get the resource(s) on scene in a timely manner • Within 6 hours of initial request for assistance, ensure all search and rescue operations being conducted over a geographically dispersed area are coordinated and unified between federal, state and local response partners • Within 6 hours of initial request for assistance, initiate standardized, community-based search and rescue support operations across a wide geographically dispersed area • Within 24 hours of an incident, conduct search and rescue operations for 13,086 people requiring rescue • Initiate community based search and rescue support operations across a wide geographically dispersed area • Within six hours of notification, initiate search and rescue operations to locate and rescue persons in distress, based on the requirements of state, tribal and local authorities • Within four days, ensure the synchronized deployment of local, regional, national and international teams, to reinforce ongoing search and rescue efforts and transition to short-term recovery • Identify two persons per emergency management commission as key resources to assist in managing local search and rescue operations 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-2</u> Communications, <u>ESF-5</u> Emergency Management, <u>ESF-9</u> Search and Rescue	
IMPACT	1,000 people missing (at one time- Tornado THIRA scenario); 42,000 people missing (IED Attack THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	<p>The Mass Search and Rescue Operations capability is implemented after an incident which requires search or rescue. Across the State, different organizations and jurisdictions have different levels of capability in search and rescue, which build off of each other through mutual aid during an incident response.</p> <p>Iowa has a statewide search and rescue team, Iowa Task Force 1 (IA-TF1) that can augment local response. The two main divisions are headquartered in Cedar Rapids and Sioux City, and each can be on-scene within three hours, anywhere in the State. The divisions can be deployed as a state resource, or directly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction through mutual aid with their home departments.</p>	
PLANNING		GAP DESCRIPTION
	2	Urban search and rescue divisions need to update standard operating procedures (SOPs), and develop hazard-specific SOPs for events in Iowa. Local planning needs to be reviewed and strengthened for this capability, specifically in local assets interfacing with State assets during a response.

		The synchronization of operations needs to be looked at closer locally. Efforts need to be made to clearly identify what the capabilities exist locally and ensure that they mirror the process and protocols utilized by the State USAR teams.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		The Cedar Rapids division of IA-TF1 has developed standard operating procedures for missing persons events. Continual improvement on existing search and rescue SOPs need to continue. Additional work needed in standardizing these SOPs across all levels and jurisdictions.
		NOTES
		Different responses are highlighting the need for different SOPs. Basic search and rescue is governed under ESF 9 – Search and Rescue in both the State EOP, and in local EOPs.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Grid searching techniques are not uniform across jurisdictions in Iowa, which can hamper a multi-agency response where different responding search agencies are trained in different systems. Promote the adoption and use of the National Grid Search system statewide, possibly by including it in ESF 9.
		Efforts in identifying the local assets and capabilities that are available to assist with search and rescue operations need to continue to be developed.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Look at increasing local level involvement in search and rescue operations to expedite the process.
		NOTES
		Iowa has a statewide search and rescue team. The two main divisions are headquartered in Cedar Rapids and Sioux City, and each can be on-scene within three hours, anywhere in the State. Multiple local jurisdictions across the state have some level of basic search and rescue capability.
		Across the State, different organizations and jurisdictions have different levels of capability in search and rescue, which build off of each other during an effective response. Review needs to be completed in order to ensure different capacities across the State can be leveraged and joined. Can they integrate together seamlessly when necessary?
Need to review further whether to train key people in each county on search and rescue techniques, to ensure core competency in managing a SAR incident.		
Deployment of teams needs to be clarified across the State; Cedar Rapids/Sioux City divisions of Iowa Task Force I can be deployed as a state resource, or as part of direct jurisdiction to jurisdiction mutual aid.		
ORGANIZATION		MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION

MUTUAL AID	4	Federal search and rescue teams are available across the country through mutual aid. Efforts must be made to ensure that federal resources integrate seamlessly with local and state resources.
EQUIPMENT	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Future needs in equipment include maintenance and any necessary replacement. The teams need to develop a transportation capability for a more focused, scaled down response, when all the equipment in the main equipment trailers isn't needed.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		All equipment is up to date and maintained by the specific departments. The Sioux City division has purchased swift-water rescue equipment in the past year, and both divisions have trained in the use of this equipment. Sustain equipment on an as needed basis, usually when a piece of equipment reaches the end of its service life.
		NOTES
There is an abundance of equipment necessary for mass search and rescue. The existence of the State USAR team, along with their equipment, means a fully supported search and rescue effort can be made anywhere in the State.		
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION N/A
TRAINING	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Personnel turnover makes it difficult to be completely up to date on all training related to this capability. Due to limited availability of specific courses Iowa struggles to train people in a timely manner. Work needs to be made to identify common training requirements and standardize it statewide. This will aid in the unification and synchronization efforts during transition from local to state response efforts regardless of the location.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Standardize training efforts across all levels and jurisdictions.
		NOTES
Most required courses are DHS sponsored, and have certain attendance requirements before they are held. If DHS chooses not to have a course, Iowa's teams must wait DHS again holds the course before they can get this training. Across the State, wide area search classes are held. If a gap exists, it's in ensuring there's a consistent standard between departments and resources statewide that ensures integration.		
EXERCISE	4	GAP DESCRIPTION Based on recent events new SOPs need to be developed and exercised for the team. The capability hasn't been specifically exercised in controlled conditions in two years. However, the team responded to two incidents

		last year, did after-action reporting on those incidents, and implemented changes for improvement.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Continue to identify ways to integrate search and rescue efforts into existing exercises.
		NOTES
		ESF 9 (Search and Rescue) is rarely exercised.



ON-SCENE SECURITY, PROTECTION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security, situational awareness, and operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.							
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Within 6 hours of an incident, provide security and law enforcement services to protect emergency responders and 172,346 people affected Within 6 hours of incident stabilization, establish a safe and secure environment in the impacted area and decrease the risk of further damage to persons, property and the environment. Ensure the appropriate level of LE staffing exist locally or through mutual aid efforts to sustain the established secure environment Within 10 days, provide and maintain on-scene security and meet the protection needs of the affected population and eliminate or mitigate risk of further damage to persons, property and the environment 							
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-13</u> Public Safety & Security							
IMPACT	99 counties; 3,000,000 people (Iowa City Tornado THIRA scenario)							
SUMMARY	<p>The On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement capability takes place immediately after an incident, through to the close of the scene. The capability directs the use of law enforcement and other security assets to provide scene safety for responders working the scene.</p> <p>Local law enforcement and county sheriff departments provide for this capability on-scene. If more security resources are needed, mutual aid is available to draw in assets from other jurisdictions. Local resources can also be supplemented by Iowa State Patrol officers. Private industry security resources can be used to supplement sworn officers, and depending on the security need, other responders/volunteers could fulfill specific security roles.</p>							
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Plans to provide this capability include State and local emergency response plans, specifically ESFs 5 (Emergency Management) and 13 (Law Enforcement), department-specific procedures and policies, and the overall National Incident Management System (NIMS) for response coordination.								
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr style="background-color: #ffe0b2;"> <th style="text-align: center;">MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION</th> </tr> <tr> <td>N/A</td> </tr> </table>	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION	N/A				
MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION								
N/A								

ORGANIZATION	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
Between local, county, State and federal law enforcement assets, mutual aid and private sector partners, the organization is in place to implement this capability. If work is required, it is in coordinating different agencies together during a response.		
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	5	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		Both the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and the Iowa Mutual Aid Compact (IMAC) can be used to get mutual aid assets from other jurisdictions or states.
EQUIPMENT	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		None currently identified.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
N/A		
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	5	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		If equipment is needed, both EMAC and IMAC are available as mechanisms to obtain resources.
TRAINING	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Scene safety is part of basic law enforcement training.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
N/A		
EXERCISE	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
This capability has been tested many times during real-world events over the last few years. All events, big or small, have some element of scene safety and security to them.		



OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure 100% adoption of the National Interoperability Channels statewide • Develop two communications unit leaders (COM-Ls)/communications technicians (COM-Ts) for each local emergency management commission • Within 12 hours of an incident, establish interoperable communications across 947 jurisdictions affected and with 29 partner organizations involved in incident management. Maintain for 2 weeks • Within 12 hours, ensure the capacity to communicate with both the emergency response community and the impacted populations • Within 7 days, re-establish sufficient communications infrastructure within the affected areas to support ongoing life sustaining activities, provide basic human needs, and transition to short-term recovery • Within 7 days, re-establish sufficient data communications infrastructure within the affected areas to support ongoing life sustaining activities, provide basic human needs, and transition to short-term recovery efforts. Ensure proper redundant data communications streams exist for key decision making officials 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-1</u> Transportation, <u>ESF-2</u> Communications, <u>ESF-3</u> Public Works & Engineering, <u>ESF-4</u> Firefighting, <u>ESF-5</u> Emergency Management, <u>ESF-6</u> Mass Care, <u>ESF-7</u> Logistics & Resource Management, <u>ESF-8</u> Public Health & Medical, <u>ESF-9</u> Search and Rescue, <u>ESF-10</u> Hazmat, <u>ESF-11</u> Agriculture & Natural Resources, <u>ESF-12</u> Energy, <u>ESF-13</u> Public Safety & Security, <u>ESF-14</u> Recovery, <u>ESF-15</u> External Affairs	
IMPACT	33 Public Answering Points affected; multiple cell towers (Cyber Attack THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	<p>The Operational Communications capability takes place immediately following an incident, and ensures that responders are able to communicate. Locally, jurisdictions are responsible for ensuring that their responders can communicate with each other. Resources are available statewide to ensure connectivity of disparate systems.</p> <p>Iowa's interoperable and emergency communications environment consists mainly (75 percent) of disparate very-high frequency (VHF) systems, some (approximately 15 percent) 800 MHz systems, and a small number of ultra-high frequency (UHF) systems. While numerous State agencies use emergency communications systems, the State of Iowa currently does not have a statewide public safety radio system or network due to lack of funding and the need for greater legislative support. Regional, State, and local agencies' radio communications systems consist primarily of separate systems; however, RACOM Communications, a privately owned and operated analog communications system, maintains a substantial presence in Iowa serving public safety agencies.</p>	
PLANNING	2	<p style="text-align: center;">GAP DESCRIPTION</p> <p>A regional governance structure needs to be implemented to plan for inter-operable communications. Personnel and time would be needed to provide</p>

		<p>this structure. Plans would need to specify how the Strategic Technology Reserve (STR) created by the Interoperability Board is to be utilized. Tactical Interoperable Communications Plans (TICPs) need to be developed in 96 counties (3 in place currently).</p> <p>The Communications Asset and Survey Mapping (CASM) Tool is currently being implemented in Iowa, documenting communications equipment/radio caches and resources across the state. When completely populated, the tool will provide an accurate picture of communications resources across Iowa, and will be able to produce incident-specific TICPs, based on the assets being brought in to assist.</p> <p>A review needs to be completed on who provides insurance for the Strategic Technology Reserve (STR) communications trailers in an exercise, vs. a disaster.</p>
		RECENT ADVANCES
		<p>New work assessments and feasibility studies have been conducted by the State Interoperable Communications Board. The next step is to develop regional governance structures. The Interoperability Board is doing outreach and education on the TICP process.</p>
		NOTES
		<p>Iowa law states that the State Interoperable Communications Board has the responsibility for interoperable communication within the state.</p>
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		<p>Because of the size of the project, time and personnel would be needed to formalize the structure which would get the State of Iowa closer to achieving a score of 5. The effort would be lead by the State Interoperable Communications Board.</p> <p>Need to identify and train two key persons at the county level that can act as COM-Ls and COM-Ts for each emergency management commission.</p> <p>Additional work is needed to ensure that different resources from different jurisdictions can work seamlessly in conjunction with one another.</p>
		RECENT ADVANCES
		<p>The Interoperability Board is working toward establishing regional communications governance structures. Iowa opted into the FirstNet cellular network in July 2017. Once fully implemented, it will provide a unified, high speed network for first responders to utilize.</p>
		NOTES
		<p>During a communications failure, specific communications vendors would be making the repair and replacement on any damaged systems, and would be bringing in any necessary resources to backfill communications needs during the outage.</p>
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	4	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		<p>Out of state Telecommunications Emergency Response Teams are available to assist during communications outages.</p>

EQUIPMENT	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Iowa needs to develop statewide communications interoperability for both voice and data. A national backbone is being implemented solely for public safety use. In 2017, Iowa opted into the FirstNet cellular network and will continue to work towards full implementation statewide for first responder use.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Iowa purchased three Strategic Technology Reserves (communications trailers) to re-establish communications during a catastrophic loss. Equipment for short term outages rates a score of (4); equipment for longer-term outages is closer to a (3).
		NOTES
		N/A
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	5	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		IMAC and EMAC can be used to attain needed equipment.
TRAINING	1	GAP DESCRIPTION
		It would be very difficult to reach a level 5. Training will need to be conducted to create COM-Ls and COM-Ts that understand how to activate and deploy Strategic Technology Reserve resources. Additional training efforts are needed at the county level regarding the STR trailers: there locations, uses and how to request them. Interoperable communications training efforts between responders needs to be increased statewide.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		First, the organization piece needs to be addressed. Once a basic level of organization capability exists, standardized training plans can be developed.
		NOTES
		N/A
EXERCISE	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Most exercises in the state test communication aspect of their plans, but because of new personnel and technology, adjustments are continually needed to be considered successful. Iowa needs to create exercise protocols focused on emergency communication.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Because the State of Iowa has always had exercise requirements, communications almost always is tested. This means the plans are always tested and revised. Also, the State's most recent Training and Exercise Workshop indicated that communications was an issue. We are attempting to determine the true issue.
		NOTES
		N/A

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PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTHCARE AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Provide lifesaving medical treatment via emergency medical services and related operations and prevent additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health and medical support and products to all people in need within the affected area.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Within 12 hours of an incident, complete triage, begin definitive medical treatment, and transfer to an appropriate facility 112,606 people requiring medical care Within 24 hours of the incident, mobilize and equip needed medical professionals and equipment and establish an efficient way to process, treat and discharge impacted individuals requiring medical assistance Within 24 hours, have the capability to provide the needed level of medical personnel and equipment. After event stabilization, return medical surge resources back to pre-disaster levels within 60 days Within 24 hours, identify the pathogen or cause of illness and define the population being affected Within 36 hours, communicate prevention and control measures to affected populations Within 48 hours, deliver medical countermeasures to exposed populations 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	ESF-8 Public Health & Medical	
IMPACT	2,100,000 patients (over 1 year); 99 counties (Tornado THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	The Public Health, Healthcare and Emergency Medical Services capability is implemented after the discovery of a pathogen or illness.	
PLANNING	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The gap is personnel to develop and maintain plans, because of a lack of personnel it becomes difficult to maintain collaboration with partner agencies. Development and the implementation of protocols to return medical surge resources to pre-incident levels is something that needs to be considered.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		The Public Health Emergency Response Plan has been finalized – currently developing the supporting documentation for the plan. Real world events with cryptosporidium and cyclosporum have occurred in the last two years.
		NOTES
		Standard operating procedures still need to be developed for the plan.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The gap is in personnel. There is a lack of depth in essential positions. In the short term, this score would be a 4 or 5, but a widespread disease outbreak would cause sustainment problems.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A

		NOTES
		N/A
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	4	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		The Centers for Disease Control would play a role in a large-scale health incident.
EQUIPMENT	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Most of the equipment has been purchased, but the need for personnel to operate and maintain the equipment is becoming an issue.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
N/A		
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Training is up to date for necessary personnel, but turnover requires continual training of new people.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Training continues to be made available to both public and private responders. Training includes course offered through the Learning Management System and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
		NOTES
N/A		
EXERCISE	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		To obtain a rating of 5, no specific exercise activities would be needed. The gap is the time needed for personnel to participate in exercises.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Multiple incidents over the past year have required activation of portions of the Public Health Emergency Response Plan.
		NOTES
N/A		



SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of response.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within 6 hours of incident, and on a 24 hours cycle thereafter, provide notification to leadership and 29 partner organizations involved in incident management of the current and projected situation. Maintain for 1 month • Within specified timeframes (1 hour – city; 3 hours – county; 6 hrs – State), and continuing throughout the incident, deliver information sufficient to inform decision making regarding immediate lifesaving and sustaining activities and engage governmental, private and situation-specific partners within and outside of the impacted area to meet basic human needs and stabilize the incident • Deliver enhanced information to reinforce ongoing lifesaving and life-sustaining activities, and engage governmental, private, and civic sector resources within and outside of the affected area to meet basic human needs, stabilize the incident, and transition to recovery 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-1</u> Transportation, <u>ESF-2</u> Communications, <u>ESF-3</u> Public Works & Engineering, <u>ESF-4</u> Firefighting, <u>ESF-5</u> Emergency Management, <u>ESF-6</u> Mass Care, <u>ESF-7</u> Logistics & Resource Management, <u>ESF-8</u> Public Health & Medical, <u>ESF-9</u> Search and Rescue, <u>ESF-10</u> Hazmat, <u>ESF-11</u> Agriculture & Natural Resources, <u>ESF-12</u> Energy, <u>ESF-13</u> Public Safety & Security, <u>ESF-14</u> Recovery, <u>ESF-15</u> External Affairs	
IMPACT	99 counties (Human Disease THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	<p>The Situational Assessment capability is implemented immediately upon notification that an incident is either imminent, or has occurred. The situational assessment capability is loosely guided by ESF 5 (Emergency Management) in both the State Emergency Response Plan, and county emergency response plans.</p> <p>Situational assessment occurs in all types of emergency responses. According to the tenets of incident command, the first responding official provides initial scene size up and begins the process of calling for any necessary resources to stabilize and respond to the emergency. Depending on the size and scope of the incident, notifications are then made to applicable parties at the local level, including other response agencies and the local emergency management coordinator. If necessary, notifications can then be made to state agencies through 24 hour duty officers. Lines of communication are in place for federal-level notification of large incidents by the State, if necessary.</p>	
PLANNING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The processes and procedures for situational awareness exist in different jurisdictions across the state, but need to be reviewed to see what is written down in plan form, and what is just “done on its own.” All jurisdictions should have emergency operations plans that include processes to provide situational awareness within one hour of the incident, or within one hour of a request by an emergency manager. Work on creating a standardize list of information needed for accurate and appropriate situational reports.

		Additional functional areas that need further development: analyzing information, stakeholder engagement and tracking response activities.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Work on identifying a standardized list of information that is commonly requested by local coordinators and state emergency management.
		NOTES
		The situational assessment capability is loosely guided by ESF 5 in both the State Emergency Response Plan, and county emergency response plans. WebEOC is used by state and local EOCs across the State of Iowa as a web-based disaster response information interface, providing a common operating picture for all users. Counties can communicate situational awareness information with duty officers from a variety of agencies, depending on incident circumstances and needs. Alerts can be sent by HSEMD to priority personnel through the Alert Iowa System. Additionally, 84 counties are currently utilizing the mass notification system for sharing critical information within their jurisdictions.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The organizational pieces exist across the state for situational awareness, but work still needs to be done to provide depth, and ensure that awareness information is shared widely when appropriate. Continue to refine the triggers for the activation of the State EOC in support of local response efforts once multiple counties are impacted by the same event.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Continue to identify and define the triggers to activate an EOC at the local and state level and ensure that it's applied uniformly.
		NOTES
		Between hundreds of cities with emergency response departments, 99 counties represented by emergency management coordinators, State agencies with an emergency response role, Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management, duty officers from various agencies, and the Incident Management Team, the organization exists to share situation information. Depth needs to be developed further for situational awareness.
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	5	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		Incident Management Teams with a situational awareness capability are available through EMAC.
EQUIPMENT	5	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Many smaller communities do not have redundant communications capabilities to provide information on their situation immediately after a disaster.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Social media (Facebook/Twitter), at least on the State side, has been effective in gaining situational awareness from constituents. Local partners have been increasingly using social media to inform constituents.
		NOTES

		WebEOC is used as the state’s portal for situational awareness. Efforts should be made to allow local emergency managers to use WebEOC to interface with jurisdictions to gain situational awareness.
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The gap in this capability is knowing the correct questions to ask to gain perspective on situational awareness. What training is available to teach someone less familiar with or newer to emergency management about how to assess an incident, and what key pieces of information are necessary to form useful conclusions?
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Focus on addressing situational assessment training gaps present to newer emergency management staff.
		NOTES
Continue to refine and standardize processes to collect information that will provide situational awareness and facilitate decision making.		
EXERCISE	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Situational awareness is exercised during each event and exercise, though not always explicitly. An exercise needs to be conducted specifically on pre-event awareness and information sharing, which can be attached to any regularly-scheduled exercise that tests the system from the local jurisdiction to the State EOC. Continue to identify ways to integrate lessons learned and best practices identified within AARs.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Focus on integrating this capability into existing exercise efforts, making it more of a primary objective and not a indirect one.
		NOTES
N/A		

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ECONOMIC RECOVERY

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Restore economic and business activities in the impacted community to a sustainable level in accordance with the timeline and milestones identified in the recovery plan to include new economic opportunities as they present themselves.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within one month, determine the extent of the impacts to local businesses and establish a strategy to restore economic activities within the impacted areas in accordance to the recovery timeline and objectives established within the local and state recovery plans • Within one month, establish an effective and efficient way to determine the impacts to the local economy through new and previously established public-private partnerships and ensure they align with the existing local and state recovery plans • Within 1 year of an incident, reopen 23,178 businesses closed due to the incident • During steady-state times, work on strengthening public-private partnerships through outreach programs and assist with the development and/or enhancement of those businesses that are categorized critical infrastructure. Continue to work towards integrating private sector partners (critical infrastructure) into existing public sector planning efforts when mutually beneficial relationships are identified 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	ESF-5 Emergency Management, ESF-14 Recovery	
IMPACT	\$50 billion (Animal Disease THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	The Economic Recovery capability begins during the response phase of an incident, and continues long after disaster strikes. It can take a long time for business to return to pre-disaster levels. The Economic Recovery capability is related to many other capabilities pertaining to recovery such as housing, infrastructure systems, and community resilience among others. For economic activities to resume other areas of recovery must be stabilized. For example, if people are worried about finding a place to live they aren't likely to be participating in other economic activities.	
PLANNING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Guidance for local ESF 14s needs to be developed. Many private businesses have continuity of operations (COOP) plans, but quality and scale varies. Other businesses have no COOP plans at all. During the response phase of an incident, gathering reliable and accurate data on economic impacts is needed. Additional work is needed to develop recovery objectives for private sector businesses to aid in their rehabilitation. Continue to identify ways for local and state emergency management to integrate in economic recovery planning efforts.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Assist private business owners with COOP planning efforts and highlight the importance of COOP planning.
		NOTES

		Scoring for the State as a collection of private entities is difficult. Some plans definitely exist, but there is room for improvement.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION N/A
ORGANIZATION	3	GAP DESCRIPTION Continued staffing of the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Recovery Division.
		RECENT ADVANCES Look at cross training with IEDA and HSEMD's Recovery Division.
		NOTES Current operations are sufficient, but as federal funding declines the Recovery Bureau would have to grow in response to a catastrophic event.
		MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION N/A
		GAP DESCRIPTION New technology could be added to streamline some recovery functions and make things such as damage assessments a quicker process.
EQUIPMENT	4	RECENT ADVANCES HSEMD Recovery has started using tablet computers to aid in damage assessment.
		NOTES N/A
		MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION N/A
		GAP DESCRIPTION Core staff for the State must continue progress on completion of relevant courses and training to maintain skills and capabilities. Additional training for local and private entities may be necessary.
TRAINING	3	RECENT ADVANCES Incorporation of economic development priorities during disasters to local and state emergency management staff as a refresher.
		NOTES N/A
		MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION N/A
EXERCISE	N/A	GAP DESCRIPTION N/A
		RECENT ADVANCES N/A
		NOTES N/A
		MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION N/A
		GAP DESCRIPTION N/A



HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Restore and improve health and social services networks to promote the resilience, independence, health (including behavioral health), and well-being of the whole community.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure the capability exists to provide basic health and social services functions in the identified impacted areas. Ensure the proper support structure exists within the health and social services network to promote the resilience, health, independence and well-being of the impacted areas through a standardized needs assessment process • Supplement the health and social service networks identified through the needs assessment process and included in the recovery timeline to promote the resilience, health, independence and well-being of the impacted community • Restore basic health and social services functions within the impacted areas to insure those requiring medical/social care receive it in a timely manner. During steady-state times, work towards identifying critical areas of need for health and social services, as well as key partners and at-risk individuals in short and intermediate long-term recovery • Complete an assessment of health and social service needs in the impacted community, and develop a comprehensive recovery timeline • Restore and improve the resilience and sustainability of the health and social services networks to meet the needs of and promote independence and well-being of impacted community members in accordance with the recovery timeline • Within 1 months of an incident, restore functions at 131 affected healthcare facilities and social service organizations 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	ESF-6 Mass Care, ESF-8 Public Health & Medical	
IMPACT	300,000 people in need of assistance; 99 counties (Human Disease THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	Health and Social Services pertains to disaster-related social services, to include disaster-related casework management.	
PLANNING	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The basic planning to provide health and social services to a large number of people is in place. There is a disparity across the state in the level of planning for this capability. Additional effort is needed to integrate the State Individual Assistance Program and Disaster Case Management Process into state and local plans. Integration of state and local emergency management into planning efforts is needed.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Continue to work towards identifying ways to integrate decision makers into the planning processes.
		NOTES
PLANNING		MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION

MUTUAL AID	N/A	N/A
ORGANIZATION	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		There is a lack of education for decision makers regarding what this capability can do, and how it is accessed. This education has begun to take place, but much work is required to fully integrate the capability into the overall emergency response structure. Continued education of partners needs to take place. Statewide, there is a lack of trained professionals available to do the kind of work this capability requires for a large-scale incident.
		Mental and behavioral health staffing to address the local and state needs is a sizable shortfall.
		Within this capability, many organizations lack the appropriate level of staff to effectively execute their plans.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Conduct an evaluation regarding staffing shortfalls first before additional steps are taken.
		NOTES
N/A		
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		Assets under this capability could be found with EMAC and IMAC, but there is no accurate picture of what is available.
EQUIPMENT	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Basic equipment is a “go-kit” that includes assessment materials and educational information. Gap is in communications equipment – need to equip responders with some sort of mechanism to communicate with each other, and with the EOC.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
N/A		
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		A set curriculum is in place for training requirements for responders under this capability, and they are required to complete that curriculum before they are deployed. In addition, skill sets of responders are tracked. As turnover occurs in agencies that have a role in this capability, people must be retrained. Most responders that engage in this capability are accredited by the institutions they work for.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES

		N/A
EXERCISE	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The Disaster Behavior Assessment Team participates in nuclear power plant exercises, along with other exercises. In addition, the team has activated for 24 real-world events in the last two years. After each activation of the team, after-action reporting and improvement planning is done.
		This capability needs to be exercised statewide, which is a sizeable undertaking due to the vast amounts of organization-specific terminology. There also isn't a lot of reserve personnel in any one given area to fall back on for large scale or long duration events.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Look at identifying ways to integrate health and social services efforts into existing exercises.
		NOTES
		N/A

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HOUSING

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Implement housing solutions that effectively support the needs of the whole community and contribute to its sustainability and resilience.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within 30 days of the event, establish a housing taskforce to analyze the existing housing need of the impacted area(s) and work towards identifying unmet needs, leveraging existing relationships between public-private sectors and securing long-term housing options for displaced individuals and families in a timely manner • Establish a resilient and sustainable housing market that meets the interim and long-term needs of the impacted community within the specified time frame identified in their recovery plans • Within 1 year of an incident, 11003 people requiring long-term housing, including 946 people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible long-term housing), find and secure long-term housing 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	ESF-6 Mass Care, ESF-14 Recovery	
IMPACT	10,000 displaced people (River Flooding THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	The Housing capability happens during the long-term recovery process. It is predicated on creating a resilient and sustainable housing market in impacted communities.	
PLANNING	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		A standing program needs to be developed for housing assistance, especially state-funded assistance, which can then be activated as necessary. Uniform policy directives need to be established, including triggers for activation, eligible costs, and funding requirements. Much of the planning for disaster housing is done once a disaster occurs, which presents confusion and problems in the consistency of requirements and uses. Continued refinement of the Housing Recovery Support Function (RSF4) within the local and state disaster recovery plans.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Evaluate the findings of the housing taskforce established earlier in 2018.
		NOTES
		The housing capability is guided under the State of Iowa Recovery Plan. Specific programs are governed by administrative rules. Federal programs are governed by different recipient agencies.
PLANNING MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
ORGANIZATION	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Develop a standing Housing Recovery Task Force to provide strategic direction for Iowa's activities in the housing capability. Leverage a standing long-term housing program to build relationships between the multiple players in this capability. Analysis needs to be conducted to see what capability exists at the local level and attempt to integrate these efforts into the Housing Recovery Taskforce.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A

		NOTES
		The Iowa Finance Authority (IFA) runs the State housing program, but there is no set program or protocol in place at IFA to do this, and it's done on an ad hoc basis, post-disaster. IFA contracts with Councils of Government (COGs) and Entitlement Cities for grant administration.
ORGANIZATION MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
EQUIPMENT	N/A	GAP DESCRIPTION
		N/
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
	N/A	
EQUIPMENT MUTUAL AID	N/A	MUTUAL AID DESCRIPTION
		N/A
TRAINING	1	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Once a static housing program is identified, training requirements need to be assessed in the administration of that program. Courses will have to be identified, and personnel identified to take them.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
	N/A	
EXERCISE	1	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Iowa needs to do an exercise on recovery, whether in conjunction with another exercise, or as a stand-alone event. The housing element would be an integral part that would need to be included.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
	N/A	



NATURAL AND CULTURAL RESOURCES

CAPABILITY DEFINITION	Protect, preserve, conserve, rehabilitate, and restore natural and cultural resources and historic properties consistent with the post disaster priorities and timelines of the impacted area and applicable statutes.	
CAPABILITY TARGETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect, preserve, conserve, rehabilitate, and restore natural and cultural resources to include historic landmarks impacted consistent with the post disaster priorities and timelines of the impacted area and applicable statutes • Within 1 year of an incident, restore 346 damaged natural and cultural resources and historic properties registered in the jurisdiction 	
IDENTIFIED ESF(S)	<u>ESF-11</u> Agriculture & Natural Resources, <u>ESF-14</u> Recovery	
IMPACT	(Winter Storm THIRA scenario)	
SUMMARY	The Natural and Cultural Resources capability is active at all times. Monitoring of water levels takes place whether water levels are normal, high, or low. It also covers addressing of immediate concerns for the environment, natural or built, during a disaster. Processes continue into recovery phase as non-emergency issues are dealt with such as utilizing proper materials for repairing a historical site.	
PLANNING	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Extensive plans exist for some aspects of this capability, primarily on the water resource side. Plans need to be developed for other aspects including wildlife, forests and parks, and cultural/historical resources.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Water resource plans have recently been updated and recent efforts at natural resource enhancement has included mitigation considerations.
		NOTES
For much of this type of event adjustments are made to planned events and projects based on reduced water levels. Projects involving construction on or near water are prioritized because of reduced effort to complete them during low water levels. Season wetland work is curtailed to reduce risk to sensitive wildlife areas. Wildland fire specialists promote awareness of fire risk during droughts. Historical sites are monitored based on potential impacts of drought conditions.		
ORGANIZATION	3	GAP DESCRIPTION
		In a catastrophic event situation Cultural Resources would have trouble handling requests for technical assistance.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		The department has recently undergone restructuring that has streamlined some of the decision making process.
		NOTES
The Department of Natural Resources is well suited to monitoring the impacts of a drought. Each subject area is managed within a bureau		

		structure with an overall management structure to coordinate, facilitate, and prioritize natural and cultural resource needs with department resource availability.
EQUIPMENT	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		The department does have equipment that can be utilized on a smaller scale and would utilize other agencies/contractors for specialized projects. Most of what the department does is monitoring and technical support. Equipment utilized in the effort is being maintained and updated based on a maintenance schedule and available funding levels.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Addition of monitoring equipment on various rivers and maintenance and repair of existing equipment has been done in conjunction with other local, state, and federal agencies and groups.
		NOTES
		There are no pieces of equipment that can alleviate drought conditions on a large scale. In most cases the department focuses on monitoring drought conditions and impacts. As necessary, appropriate, and feasible the department will utilize equipment designated for one use for another during disasters of all types.
TRAINING	4	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Little training can be done over and above the normal training staff receives. Training on new monitoring equipment being installed is conducted for staff working with those pieces of equipment at the time of installation.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		N/A
		NOTES
		Most efforts focus on monitoring facilities and resources during a drought. These are normal activities performed by department staff and would require very little additional training.
EXERCISE	2	GAP DESCRIPTION
		Parts of the department conduct exercises on a regular basis for a variety of disasters. Wildlife, fisheries, and forestry staff focus more on diseases and infestations than drought.
		RECENT ADVANCES
		Recent conditions have led to more discussions between different groups within the department and a sharing of response and monitoring methodologies and information.
		NOTES
		Wildlife, fisheries, forestry, and parks staff are isolated or work in small groups and cover large areas. The size of work units makes exercises difficult to facilitate.